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The Truth About
South Korea



EDITORIAL

Jamaica

As we prepare this issue for typesetting, the results of the October 30 general election in Jamaica were just becoming clear. Much to the dismay of progressives around the world, the rightwing Jamaica Labor Party appeared to have won about 50 of the 60 seats in the Parliament, and Edward Seaga was to become Prime Minister. Michael Manley's Peoples National Party received about 47% of the popular vote, but close losses in marginal seats gave Seaga his lopsided margin in the legislature.

Two factors—one long-term and one short-term—appear responsible for this latest successful destabilization campaign. In the long view, the economic destabilization which has been waged since Manley's reelection in 1976 took its toll. A well-planned and well-executed covert attack on a nation's entire economy is a sophisticated operation. Since it is designed to be conducted in a way that the people do not know it is happening, it is all the more difficult to explain to the people what has really been done to them. Voters faced with lower wages, or no job at all, with food shortages, with the outrageous increases in oil prices, will tend to blame the incumbents, whoever they are, and vote "for a change." It is not easy to demonstrate how outside forces may have conspired to cripple the tourism industry, how multinationals may have connived to create totally artificial food shortages, how the international financial institutions may have deliberately set conditions upon loans and other agreements designed to lower the wages of the workers and raise the profits of the corporations.

This campaign, which we have documented in past issues (see CAIB Numbers 1, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10), probably had the greatest impact on the voters. But, in the short run, the concerted campaign of violence over the past year also was instrumental in the ouster of Manley. Gun-running, intimately linked to the JLP, and tied directly and indirectly to the Western intelligence forces, led to unprecedented violence, to the murders of numerous PNP organizers (and hundreds of innocent bystanders as well), and to the intimidation of voters both in the voter registration process and in the election itself.

It should be clear that despite the division of the seats in Parliament, Seaga has no clear mandate. It is equally clear that he and his most vicious followers will use the election results to continue the violent attack upon the progressive forces in Jamaica which has been part of the election campaign up till now. We greatly fear the possibility of a bloodbath, as in Chile, and hope that the world will continue to watch Jamaica carefully, to provide a shield against indiscriminate violence. Already there are stories of numerous arrests, and the shootings did not stop when the polling was over.

The Intelligence Identities Protection Act

As our readers must be aware, the regular session of Congress ended early in October without any floor action in either House on the bill designed to prevent the exposure of intelligence abuses and personnel. However, we are informed that the bill will come up early in the lame duck

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session scheduled to begin in mid-November. As we note in this issue's article on the AFIO convention, Deputy Director Carlucci announced that the Agency will be pushing for the passage of the bill once again as soon as Congress is back in session. Progressive forces which have united in the fight against the bill will be hard at work again, and there are still hopes that the amendments of the Senate Judiciary Committee designed to protect to some degree the First Amendment rights of journalists will withstand a floor fight.

However, the mood of the country is by no means liberal. Ronald Reagan will be the next President -- more to the point. George Bush, former Director of Central Intelligence, will be the next Vice-President, and the new Congress will be, if anything, more to the right. Not that the Carter administration has been a bulwark of liberalism. The fight for one law after another designed to unleash the CIA and the other arms of the intelligence octopus have all been led by Democrats in a Democratic-controlled Congress. And Secretary of State Muskie reminds listeners in his speeches that his administration's "five year defense program calls for appropriations of over one *trillion* dollars between now and 1985." That's more than the combined total budgets of half the Third World for the period, and a telling indication of how much spending will be diverted from needed social programs here and abroad.

The Agee Passport Case

When the U.S. Department of State revoked Philip Agee's passport in 1979 under a regulation allowing such action when a citizen's actions and speeches are considered detrimental to U.S. foreign policy, he went to court and almost immediately won a ruling from the District Judge that the regulation was unconstitutional, a violation of freedom of speech. The government appealed, and, several months later, the Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the regulation was unlawful. All this time, because of government requests to stay the enforcement of the ruling, Agee was without a passport. The government appealed its second loss to the Supreme Court, petitioning them to hear the case, which would be at the Court's discretion. A few weeks ago, in a ruling which bodes ill for any outspoken critic of the government, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Agee is still without a passport, and the Supreme Court refused his lawyer's request for an expedited hearing. The Court will probably hear arguments in January, and decide within a few months of the hearing. Though he has never been charged with any crime or offense, Agee remains deprived of his passport--the only such case in recent decades. That the conservative Supreme Court is going to rule on the case suggests that the establishment's antipathy to Agee may lead to a bad legal precedent and yet another crack in the shield of the First Amendment.

In This Issue

As we have indicated all along, we will continue to publish the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* regardless

of the campaign in Congress. If the Intelligence Identities Protection Act is passed, we will go immediately into court to challenge its constitutionality. If we must modify the coverage of the *Bulletin* during that fight we will, but we will continue to bring to our readers the best analyses we can obtain of events around the world where the interfering hand of the United States appears.

In this issue we are fortunate to have an inside look at repression in South Korea, provided by two disillusioned former Peace Corps volunteers who saw the results of American domination with their own eyes. We have some equally cogent looks at the situation in Portugal, the Eastern Caribbean, and Guyana. And we have an analysis of the rapid growth of rightwing terrorism.

We are also finally able to bring to our readers an unusual interview with former telecommunications intelligence experts disclosing in meticulous detail the inner workings of the National Security Agency. The NSA was created allegedly to break enemy codes, but modern technology has made codes virtually unbreakable. The NSA, undaunted, has turned from code breaking to massive eavesdropping, pure and simple. It is far and away the largest eavesdropping outfit in the world, and its victims are primarily the American people, who are to a large extent completely ignorant of its existence, much less its operations.

We also present a report on the recent convention of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, attended by co-editor Louis Wolf, who received some sharp looks at the press table from members and speakers. A few, quite cautiously, were even friendly.

We have a number of additional, shorter items, part of our effort to make the *Bulletin* as comprehensive a source material as we can of developments in the intelligence field. We include for the first time a clever piece of satire by our *Sources and Methods* columnist, Ken Lawrence, as well as his regular contribution. And, undaunted, we continue to bring you our *Naming Names* column.

Finances

We are well into our third year now, and readers will note that we have had to increase our prices. Rising production costs alone have been responsible for this. The staff of *CAIB* take no salaries from it, and never have. Still, even with the modest rise in prices, it is a struggle to keep the magazine going. Times, given the political developments taking place right now, are not going to get better for some time. For the first time, we have decided to ask those of our readers who can afford it for contributions. Within the next few weeks a letter will go out to all our subscribers, asking for assistance. Help us if you can; if you can't, we understand. Keep reading us, and passing *CAIB* around; urge others to subscribe. Ask your local libraries to carry *CAIB*.

The battle against intelligence abuses is surely going to heat up over the next few years. We expect to continue to be in the front lines of that battle. The CIA's victims around the world deserve that.

Major Rightwing Threat:

NEW SPATE OF TERRORISM: KEY LEADERS UNLEASHED

by William Schaap

For years, the rhetoric of the Western Press has confused the public's image of terrorism. Virtually all progressive revolutionaries are referred to as "terrorists," while right-wing reactionaries are usually called "freedom fighters" or "rebels." Historically, when terrorism has applied to liberation struggles—notably the Irish Revolution of 1916-1921 and the Algerian Revolution of 1957-1961—it has been in the context of a colonized people fighting the colonial settlers and occupiers.

In recent times, however, nearly all the terrorism in the world has been coming from the right, from some of the most reactionary forces in existence. Yet the effect of decades of linguistic manipulation has been to create the impression that terrorism is a weapon of the left, and to obscure the real role that terrorism plays in rightist political movements. This confusion is most serious now, because of a series of events which indicate a massive increase in the use of terrorism by reactionaries, coupled with the inability of the Western powers to stem this tide, at best—or outright complicity with it, at worst.

Recent Events

Several recent events, both in the United States and elsewhere, demonstrate that terrorism of the right is on the rise, and that some of the most notorious and dangerous terrorists of recent years are being set free by Western nations, despite the lip service given to efforts to convict and jail these wanton murderers.

In the past few months, there has been an anti-Semitic bombing in Paris, France; a neo-fascist bombing in Bologna, Italy; and a neo-Nazi bombing in Munich, Germany. Even the Peoples Republic of China has acknowledged a terrorism problem after the bombing of Peking's main railroad station October 29. A repressive military government seized power in Turkey; extreme rightwing terrorist elements are on the rampage in El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Argentina.

These are just some examples of the trend in the world. In the United States the situation is also disturbing. According to several recent reports, the Ku Klux Klan is engaged in paramilitary training in at least seven states, and Cuban and Nicaraguan exiles are openly training for combat in southern Florida. But three events in September underscore the dangers which may be expected. On September 11, Felix Garcia Rodriguez, a protocol officer at the Cuban Mission to the United States in New York was assassinated, the first time that a U.N. delegate has ever been killed. On September 15, the convictions of three of the assassins who killed former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier and his associate Ronni Karpen Moffitt were overturned by the District of Columbia federal Court of Appeals. And, on September 26, the Venezuelan War Council, a military court, threw out murder charges against the infamous Orlando Bosch and three others, who had repeatedly confessed to the 1976 bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane in which all 73 passengers and crew perished, the only such incident in history.

The Anti-terrorist Campaign

Before looking at the September developments in detail, some review of the posturing by the U.S. government is in order. In March 1978, the then newly-appointed Director of the FBI, William Webster, announced with considerable fanfare the intensification of the FBI's anti-terrorism training programs. His concern, though, was not so much for innocent people as for political and commercial leaders, given the kidnappings which were occurring in Europe at the time. Only a month later the *New York Times* reported that despite Webster's assurances, the United States was woefully unprepared to deal with terrorism. Terrorism, an "operational specialist" was quoted as saying, "is like the weather. Everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything about it." But, in fact, such efforts as were mounted dealt almost exclusively with potential left-wing terrorism, indeed almost only with events such as kidnappings and takeovers of buildings. Rightwing murders and bombings were not even mentioned.

The Cuban Exiles

Yet, during this time, and continuing to the present, the most visible, the most vocal, the most active terrorists in the United States have been a small group of Cuban exiles, based primarily in southern Florida and in New Jersey, operating under several names, and generally well-known to local authorities. This group originally was dedicated to the overthrow of the Cuban government, and concentrated its efforts in hundreds of attacks against Cuba and Cuban-related offices and personnel around the world. They were all involved in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. They were all trained, supplied and encouraged by the CIA.

During the 1960s, most of the group's efforts were directly related to their unending war against Cuba, but during the 1970s they expanded their horizons. In the words of investigative journalist Joe Trento of the *Wilmington News-Journal*, "they contracted themselves out as a hit team to provide at least two intelligence services with an assassination capability." Trento is referring to Chile's DINA and South Africa's BOSS. The group, centered around Orlando Bosch, is implicated in the killing of exiled Chilean Gen. Carlos Prats and his wife in 1974; the attempted assassination of exiled Chilean politician Bernardo Leighton and his wife in 1975; the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt in 1976; and the murder of South African economist Robert Smit and his wife in 1977.



Orlando Bosch

According to a compilation of each incident attributed to this group in the October 19, 1980 *Granma*, they included, in addition to the foregoing, 85 bombings, one bazooka attack (for which Bosch served four years in prison in the U.S.), several shootings, four unsuccessful murder attempts, and two other murders in 1979, those of Carlos Muniz Varela, a member of the Antonio Maceo Brigade in Puerto Rico, and of Eulalio J. Negrin, a Cuban living in New Jersey, who supported the dialogue between the Cuban exile community and the Cuban government. (*New Times* magazine, on October 29, 1976, attributed "150 bombings and some 50 murders in the last two years" to Bosch, but no list was provided.)

U.S. Inaction

What is most amazing about this avalanche of terrorism is that the United States authorities, local, state, and federal, have done virtually nothing to stop it. The conviction of the Letelier hit men was virtually the only retribution, and that has been overturned. A Cuban activist living in Boston was recently quoted by *In These Times*: "The government allows the right-wing Cubans to operate with impunity. That's a fact. The government organized them, trained them and armed them years ago. Now the government has the responsibility to disarm them."

The influence of these terrorist groups is so great that they took over the processing of Cuban emigrants in Key West this Spring. At a processing center staffed by 45 Marines, there were 500 "volunteers" from Brigade 2506—the Bay of Pigs veterans. These terrorists—sometimes known as CORU (the Commandos of United Revolutionary Organizations), sometimes CNM (Cuban Nationalist Movement), sometimes Omega 7, sometimes Alpha 66, but always virtually the same group of people—must be taken seriously. Even the old-timers, particularly the Cuban Patriotic Junta, led by Tony Varona, a Cuban government official in the 1930s and 1940s, announced in Florida October 3 that "more than 200 Cuban exile groups" were commencing a "united effort to overthrow Fidel Castro." He was accompanied by members of Omega 7, Alpha 66, and Brigade 2506.

How the members of these groups, who regularly phone newspapers and claim credit for dozens of bombings, shootings and killings, can not only walk the streets, but appear at press conferences and thumb their noses at the authorities remains a mystery. At the time of the Garcia assassination in New York City, the Cuban Ambassador to the U.S., Raul Roa Kouri, stated that the FBI knew the identities of the members of Omega 7. According to the *New York Times*, the reply of an FBI agent "who has been investigating the terrorist group for five years" was hardly reassuring: "Knowing and proving are two different things." At least that FBI agent admitted to knowing who the Omega 7 people are. The irrepressible Herbert Hetu, the CIA's press spokesman, was less honest: "It's a wild accusation," he said. "I cannot comment on something like that."

Perfidy in Venezuela

Incredible as the supposed impotence of the FBI may be, the government of Venezuela did them one better. They have thrown out murder charges against Orlando Bosch and three accomplices who had repeatedly confessed to the Cubana airliner sabotage.

The scenario was not complicated. During September 1976, Orlando Bosch, in Caracas, Venezuela, under a false passport, conspired with three Venezuelan terrorists—veterans of a number of Bosch-planned ventures—to bomb a Cubana plane. The night of October 5, 1976, two of them, Freddy Lugo and Hernan Ricardo, left Caracas for Port of Spain, Trinidad. The third Venezuelan, Luis Posada, remained in Caracas with Bosch. The next morning, Lugo

and Ricardo took the first leg of the Cubana flight, from Trinidad to Barbados, under assumed names. They planted two bombs on the plane while they were one it, one near the front and one at the rear, in the toilet. When the plane landed in Barbados, Lugo and Ricardo disembarked and took a plane back to Trinidad. Shortly thereafter, the Cubana plane took off, on its final leg to Havana. On board were 57 Cubans, 11 Guyanese, and 5 North Koreans. Minutes after takeoff, the bombs exploded. Despite heroic efforts on the part of the pilot and co-pilot, the plane crashed into the sea within sight of Barbados, to which it was trying to return. Everyone aboard was killed.



Luis Posada

The next morning, Lugo and Ricardo were arrested in Trinidad. Ricardo confessed to the Trinidadian authorities, implicating Lugo, Posada and Bosch. Lugo, in his statement, purported not to be involved in the plot, but admitted that Ricardo told him about the bombing. Both were returned to Venezuela, and, along with Bosch and Posada, the four were held for trial.

The Venezuelan President at the time, Carlos Andres Perez, determined, based on the information made available to him, that there was sufficient information to charge and detain the four. The decision was also put to a Venezuelan magistrate, who had to determine if there was sufficient jurisdictional evidence to hold the suspects. The magistrate, Judge Delia Estaba Moreno, agreed that there was sufficient evidence to hold them.

Four years went by, as various pretrial maneuvers were attempted by the defendants. In the interim, President Carlos Andres Perez was replaced by Luis Herrera Campins and a Social Christian administration. On September 26, 1980, as the trial was to commence, the prosecutor announced to the court that the government had determined that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with the mass murder charges, and asked that they be dropped, to which the court agreed.

The world-wide reaction to this obvious flip-flop was quick in coming. Protests were sent to the Venezuelan government from many countries and scores of organizations. The Cuban government, whose relations with the Herrera Campins government were not good to begin with, recalled all of its diplomats from Caracas, and Fidel Castro denounced the action in a speech distributed at the U.N.

But more significant revelations were to come. The magistrate who had been involved at the initial stages, Judge Estaba Moreno, broke her silence and condemned the decision. She said, "When I ordered the arrest of those persons . . . there were well-founded indications of guilt. When the dossier left this court it contained sufficient evidence, and the arrest orders were confirmed by the military court. However, I have no idea what happened to the dossier after it left my hands."

Former President Carlos Andres Perez also spoke out. He said that, based on the information which had been made available to him in his role both as President and as Chief Magistrate, he has "the moral conviction that those being tried were in fact guilty."

Alicia Herrera's Evidence

It was not remarkable that the former magistrate and the former President could make such statements. After all, the participants had confessed; Bosch and the others had given interviews bragging about the sabotage; and all the confirming evidence—plane tickets, room reservations, phone calls, etc.—had been gathered and was well known. But the most significant revelations came from another source, Venezuelan journalist Alicia Herrera.

Alicia Herrera had been the editor of five Venezuelan magazines, and a reporter for two major daily newspapers. She had known Freddy Lugo in the 1960s, when he had



Freddy Lugo

been a photographer at the magazine for which she was working. After his incarceration she visited him several times, and got to meet Bosch, who was his cell-mate, as well as the others, Posada and Ricardo. [Bosch's cell was described in *New Times* magazine as "lined with Spanish tile wallpaper" with a Sony television set in the corner, and "fresh 'designer' sheets on the bed."]

Through many visits during their four year incarceration, Herrera learned the most minute details of the bombing, for which Bosch took primary credit. He also gave her numerous documents, some of which were extremely incriminating. During the pre-trial period she never reported on these conversations and confessions, or disclosed the documents, because the cases were pending, and because she along with everyone else, assumed that the defendants would obviously be convicted. After the decision by the prosecutor to drop the murder charges, however, Alicia Herrera spoke out. She called a press conference in Mexico, where she was at the time, and outlined the details of the plot which the participants had explained to her. She also distributed copies of some of the documents. In addition to their responsibilities for the crime itself, other less well-known facts were divulged by Ms. Herrera. She explained in some detail the group's links with the CIA, with Chile's DINA, and even with the Venezuelan secret police, DISIP, which, it turned out, were paying salaries to the terrorists during their long jail stay.



Hernan Ricardo

Bosch was most proud of his ties with DINA and the Pinochet regime, Chile being one of the few countries where he is welcome. He traveled to Chile, in fact, with Guillermo Novo, one of the Letelier-Moffitt assassins. One of the documents Bosch gave to Herrera was a letter to some of his followers recommending that they read "Mein Kampf" by Adolf Hitler.

Alicia Herrera also stated that the defendants had been confident, since the new regime took power in Venezuela, that they would be set free, and used to brag that it was just the paperwork which was holding things up. In fact, after the dismissals in September, a Venezuelan newspaper published an article by a journalist who had attended a writers convention in July, which had been addressed by President

Herrera Campins. He cryptically told the group, "Two of our colleagues will soon see their cases settled satisfactorily." This was a reference to Lugo and Ricardo, both news photographers.



Alicia Herrera

The Venezuelan military tribunal which threw out the murder charges found Bosch and Ricardo guilty of possession of false identification papers, for which they were sentenced to four and a half months in prison. However, since they are credited with time served in pretrial confinement, all four would walk out of jail as soon as the trial court decision is ratified by the military review court. That action was to have taken place within two weeks of the decision, but the court announced that it was extending the deadline by nearly two months. No reason was given, though it may be due to the world outcry against the action, and the criticism which the Venezuelan government was receiving from all quarters. It remains to be seen whether the decision will be reversed, though. If it is not, four of the most vicious and remorseless killers on earth will be walking the streets in a matter of weeks.

The Letelier-Moffitt Assassins

Bosch and his cellmates are not the only terrorists being let out. On September 15, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the convictions of Guillermo Novo, his brother Ignacio Novo, and Alvin Ross. Guillermo Novo and Ross had been found guilty of the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt, and Ignacio Novo had been convicted of lying to a grand jury about the killings and failing to report certain information to authorities. They were convicted primarily on the testimony of Michael Vernon Townley, who had planned and helped execute the bombing, and who had been returned from Chile, pleaded guilty, and testified against the others in exchange for leniency. Townley was given such favorable treatment, it is understood, because of the vast personal knowledge he had of CIA operations, including its involvement with the Chilean fascists, information which never surfaced in court. In

fact, he was sentenced to three and a half to ten years for the double murders, and will shortly be eligible for parole. Townley was a DINA operative who worked with the notorious Chilean terrorist group *Patria y Libertad* during the overthrow of Allende. He testified in great detail about how he had recruited the two Cuban exiles, Novo and Ross, for the operation, and himself planted the bomb in the wheel housing of Letelier's car.



* Less than two weeks later, Ignacio Novo was released on \$25,000 bail; no bail decision for the other two has yet been made. The government announced that it would seek a review of the appeals court panel decision from the full court; failing that, it would petition the Supreme Court to review the decision; and, if the Supreme Court declined, it would retry the men.

The legal reasons for the reversals of the convictions were not entirely unexpected, and appeared to be the result of prosecutorial overzealousness. The government, unable to force the Chilean government to extradite to the U.S. the real mastermind of the Letelier killing, former DINA head Juan Contreras Sepulveda, and having already given Michael Townley the deal of a lifetime, decided to go all out against the three "footsoldiers" at the bottom of the totem pole. In addition to Townley's testimony, the government secured further confessions by planting informers as cellmates of the defendants while they were awaiting trial. In between the trial and the appeal decision, however, the Supreme Court ruled that such tactics violated a prisoner's constitutional rights and that such testimony was inadmissible. With regard to Ignacio Novo, the court ruled that it was improper and unfair to put him on trial for such relatively minor offenses with two people who were on trial for a double murder. In fact, there seems no reason for the prosecutors to have insisted on trying Ignacio Novo with the others, and there was probably no need for the use of the testimony of the cellmates, although of course they had no reason to know that the Supreme Court was going to denounce such a practice.

In any event, of the eight terrorists in jail—the only people charged after hundreds of bombings, shootings,

and murders—one is out on bail already, two more may be out on bail shortly, one will be out on parole in a few months, and four more will be released in Venezuela in a matter of weeks. All of them, especially Juan Bosch, the mastermind, have vowed consistently to continue their murderous careers.

The Killing of Felix Garcia

Felix Garcia Rodriguez, the protocol officer at the Cuban Mission to the United States, had been active in the student movement in Havana prior to the Cuban revolution, twice arrested in anti-Batista demonstrations. He served as a combat militiaman after the revolution and became a journalist. After some time with the Cultural Department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and attending the School of Diplomatic Law, he became, in 1977, an attache at the U.N. Mission. He was described by a colleague to the *New York Times* as the "most widely known and the most widely liked" person at the Mission. On September 11, 1980, he became the first diplomat in the history of the United States to be murdered on the streets of New York City. Omega 7 claimed credit for the murder and said that Raul Roa, the Ambassador, would be "next." The group had bombed the Cuban Mission last December and unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Roa in March. To date, not a single person has been charged with any involvement in any of the scores of attacks on Cuban offices and personnel. Nor does any action seem likely.

Ironically, all of this is occurring at a time when the Cuban government is attempting to be conciliatory to the U.S. government, despite the blockade, the SR-71 overflights, the occupation of Guantanamo. The Cubans returned to the United States airplane hijackers for the first time, and released all U.S. citizens in their jails. According to a recent *New York Times* report, the Cuban Coast Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard have been working together in the apprehension of drug smugglers in the Caribbean.

Conclusion

When the U.S. talks about anti-terrorist measures, it refers almost exclusively to protection from kidnapping attempts of corporate executives, embassy personnel, and other government officials. It creates the impression that all terrorism comes from the left. Yet the evidence is mounting that there are several wide-spread terrorist networks active in the United States, all from the extreme right. Paramilitary groups like the Klan are openly training and drilling. The Omega 7 gang openly boasts of its accomplishments, and sends representatives to Florida political meetings. Brigade 2506 is actually a potent factor in Florida politics. Hit squads roam the States and even contract out for overseas work. Not only is no one being apprehended, but those who were are getting out.

The U.S. government admits that it knows who most of these people are. That they cannot obtain an arrest, much less a conviction is incredible.

REPRESSION, NOT REFORM, AS THE THRUST OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:

The Case of South Korea

by Steven Clark Hunziker*

President Carter, in his first bid for the presidency, promised to clean up a foreign policy establishment that had become a great deal less than a source of pride to the American people. Twenty years of Vietnam, assassinations of national leaders, a scorched earth policy in Cambodia and the underwriting of sleazy dictatorships across four continents had taken their toll.

Carter, stealing a platform from American revisionist scholars of diplomatic history, argued in his campaign that the "flaw" in foreign policy was the system that assumed an American right to interfere in *any* country's affairs with our vast preponderance of wealth and technology, leaving it worse off than it was before U.S. "aid" arrived. In brief, it was okay to interfere on behalf of "human rights" but wrong to interfere on behalf of local terror, the inference being that elaborate CIA operations in countries such as the Philippines and South Korea would be modified; the Agency's political party, labor union, student organization, media and journalist control and guidance programs would be abandoned altogether. Such a policy of selective morality, while incremental, was certainly a departure from the tried and true methods of Carter's predecessors.¹

Dictatorships Falling

Carter's first two years of human rights crusading were very selective, but he did cut some marginal military aid to some South American dictators. For a brief period, it looked as though Carter could play his human rights game with no serious loss to the Empire. However, the facade

began to crumble in 1979 when an ally of 39 years, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fell to the very anti-American Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Carter, apparently unwilling to take the advice of Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Schlesinger or Henry Kissinger, refused to back the Shah and launched an "interim government" program with Shahpur Bakhtiar.² Bakhtiar lasted only two months before the U.S. government's major ally in the oil rich Middle East was "lost," with considerable embarrassment to Carter and then-Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.

To add insult to injury, another ally of 40 years, the Somoza Family, was at the same time finally toppled by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Again, the interim government solution, rather than direct aid to Anastasio Somoza, was imposed with equally unsuccessful results. Nicaragua was liberated. October 1979 was a busy month. General Pak Chung Hee was also eliminated and an interim government headed by Choi Kyu Ha and Shin Hyon Hwack was established in South Korea after a month of labor and student riots threatened to topple the Pak regime.

Critics from the right were quick to point out the new flaw in American foreign policy was Carter's human rights doctrine. Carter was guilty of blocking the support necessary to maintain old and trusted despots. A "Free World" made up largely of tyrants was preferable in the long run to a foreign policy perceived as "weak." The old way, putting an anti-communist general in power and providing him an economic and military base dependent on the United States, while of some embarrassment, was still the most stable means of maintaining global influence. With a dictator, you can quietly pump money and guns to him; if he loses control, and you are criticized, you can play the "plausible denial" and "pitiful giant" ploy. It is not "interference" as much as it is strategically necessitated maintenance of a "renegade general." The bottom line for these politicians, is that Americans don't live in Third World countries; they live in the U.S. where public opinion polls can be murder. To quote Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the day after Chun Doo Hwan's coup in South Korea:

* Steven Clark Hunziker served in the Peace Corps in South Korea from 1978 to 1980, when he and three other returning volunteers launched a campaign in Europe and the United States against U.S. complicity with the South Korean regime, and against the massive brutality of that regime.

1. One could begin the list with Woodrow Wilson's destruction of Mexican Resistance led by Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa through covert aid to Venustiano Carranza, or go back even further to Grant, but a blow by blow list of Presidential credits would be quite lengthy. It is sufficient to recall Truman's intrusion in Greece, Eisenhower's in Guatemala, Kennedy's in the Congo, Johnson's in the Dominican Republic, Nixon's in Chile and Ford's in Angola.

2. "U.S., in '79, Said to Have Weighed Backing Iranian Military in a Coup," *New York Times*, April 20, 1980.

"We must decide now, whether we intend to remain the strongest nation in the world, or whether we must accept now that we will let ourselves slip into inferiority, into a position of weakness in a harsh world where principles unsupported by power are victimized, and that we will become a nation with more of a past than a future.³

Carter's "Realism"

Thus, it appears that around December 1979 Carter converted to "realism" (before the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan), a realism based on a personal and historic revelation that, in his first three years in office, he had set new records for losing large chunks of the Empire with which he was entrusted and which he was expected to pass on to his successor. Despite a few embarrassments, though, the United States is still the most powerful nation, and its only true interest appears to be freezing history while it is on top of the game, or at least slowing it down in the mineral rich, cheap labor pool of the Third World. Carter made no secret of his personal metamorphosis in his January 24, 1980 State of the Union address when he called for increased defense spending and the unleashing of the CIA.⁴

The South Korean Situation

The empire was now prepared to strike back, and unfortunately for the Korean people, the barrels were aimed at them. Thirty-eight million human beings, with no higher political authority than the United States to turn to, woke up on the cold morning of December 12th to find that their collective potential and aspirations were expendable and, in fact, had been expended.

The atmosphere of hope in South Korea after Pak's death was incredible to live through. It was as if God had brushed a serene smile on everyone's face, a smile that would not come off; the older the Korean, the broader the smile. Because KCIA chief Kim Jae Kyu had been the assassin, and the KCIA-CIA connection is well known, South Korean friends actually thanked me, because I was an American, for Pak's removal, the assumption being that Carter had done for Pak what Kennedy had done for Diem. The merits of this scenario obviously rest somewhere in Langley, Virginia. [See sidebar on the KCIA.]

The exuberance of those months blinded our ability to grasp the true nature of events prior to December. On November 6, 1979, an obscure Lieutenant General by the name of Chun Doo Hwan made his first public appearance as the head of the commission that cleared the U.S. of all complicity in Pak's murder. Prior to Chun's public debut, U.S. Ambassador Snyder was replaced by William Gleysteen fresh from the National Security Council (in 1978). General Vessey, Supreme Commander of the Joint U.S.-R.O.K. Forces, was prematurely replaced by General John

Wickham in early 1979. To say the very least, these new faces would come to play key roles in the destiny of the Korean people. It would be discovered, only at a later date, that Wickham and Chun both had their roots in airborne corps and that they had been in Vietnam at the same time, Wickham as Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs, Military Assistance Command, and Chun as part of a mercenary contingent providing military assistance.

LTG Chun, like Kim Jae Kyu, came from the Korean intelligence establishment. Pak Chung Hee had vested most of the national power in the KCIA, with Chun and his Army Security Command (military intelligence) relegated to a minor position in the Korean defense bureaucracy. Chun's reputation was one for cruelty, established during the Vietnam war; a reputation he enhanced considerably as head of the Army Security Command which runs Korea's most notorious prison torture center, So Bingo.

It was with considerable horror and shock that the Korean people received the news that Chun had borrowed troops and equipment under U.S. command and used them to knock off the entire top layer of the South Korean military, some forty generals, in effect seizing control of the interim government on December 12, 1979. This was no

**Congratulations, General, I mean
President Chun, on South Korea's
orderly return to Civilian
Government. . . .**



Steven Clark Hunziker

small feat for a Lieutenant General with no troops under his command in a military establishment that requires proper authorization before anything moves. Moreover,

3. Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, December 13, 1979.

4. It is difficult to accept that the CIA was ever substantially leashed.

half of the Korean military are under U.S. command, and cannot be unilaterally used by the Korean government; the military establishment of which I am speaking is that American-controlled half of the Korean Army, meaning Chun also had to violate several treaties in the process. Where does a young Lt. General like Chun get that kind of confidence if not from the CIA?

tial Law and against the attainment of power by Chun Doo Hwan and Shin Hyon Hwack, 687 labor strikes, and President Choi's decision to postpone elections from June 1980 to June 1981. Former Prime Minister and co-founder of the KCIA, Kim Jong Pil, furiously attempted to reorganize what was left of Pak's Democratic Republican Party (DRP) around his leadership. Kim Young Sam desperately



Citizens in Control of Kwangju

Chun's new found power, at the time, seemed essential if the mistakes of Iran and Nicaragua were not to be repeated. Pak's death had fragmented the right wing at a time when 32 years of unmet social demands had left Korean politics no way to go but to the left. A fair election would have resulted in major concessions that would have required a complete overhaul in national personnel and programs, i.e. a fundamental change. Such a change would have cut seriously into U.S. corporate and military privileges on the peninsula.

The U.S. Role

In 1979, the Carter Administration, in preparation for the long seige ahead, provided the regime with \$85,000 dollars worth of interrogation equipment and \$234,000 worth of riot-control agents⁵, apparently as part of his new human rights package. In addition, there are 600 U.S. multinationals and 400 Japanese firms that form over 50% of Korea's industrial base; over 100 U.S. army bases that provide a significant portion of Seoul's annual revenue⁶; and an oil dependency that's funneled through California-Texaco and Gulf⁷. The American presence in Korea is quite overwhelming when one lives there several years.

The first four months of 1980 were dramatic: a 20% devaluation of the won, a 59% price hike in oil, 50% inflation on household staples, nationwide protests over Mar-

attempted to hold on to the New Democratic Party (NDP), the legal opposition, after the release from prison of Kim Dae Jung, the leading opponent of the Pak regime. During this same period, the interim government was dragging its feet on producing a new constitution to replace the nationally hated Yushin System.

It was widely believed that Kim Dae Jung was released to quell public unrest and split the NDP. The strategy worked, perhaps too well. Kim Dae Jung is the most popular leader in South Korean history since Kim Ku, (a hero of the resistance against Japan). His release sparked new hope in every province in the nation. The three Kims all announced their intentions for a presidential bid. None were acceptable to the Carter Administration, which had hoped to slip in a new face like Shin Hyon Hwack as the next Korean dictator. Kim Jong Pil, it was felt in Washington, was "too tainted" to last long. Kim Young Sam was considered "less than capable," and Kim Dae Jung was believed to be "too radical."⁸

None of these men were anti-American, nor would any of them have kicked U.S. troops out of Korea precipitously. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had displayed their non-appreciation for the troop occupation of their country, but neither advocated leaving the U.S. nuclear umbrella or immediate troop withdrawal. Kim Dae Jung was an advocate of social democracy. He was for reunification,⁹ for democratic trade unions, against foreign multinational free zones, and for social reforms in housing, education and health. By today's standards, this is hardly radical and certainly not communist. Nonetheless, a South Korea con-

5. *Japan Times*, June 11, 1980, "U.S. Responsibility," by Betty Marion.

6. Thirty percent of the Korean economy is dependent on the U.S. and R.O.K. military, according to Neboyska Brashich, Director of AID in South Korea, in January, 1980.

7. Gulf Oil gave a \$4 million bribe, a "campaign contribution," to Pak in 1971, for the election U.S. journalists are fond of calling "the last free election in South Korea."

8. *Newsweek*, April 7, 1980.

9. Reunification is the number one political priority of every Korean I have ever met; the North Korean "threat" is a poor second place to this aspiration.

trolled by Kim Dae Jung would not be a South Korea controlled by the U.S.¹⁰ Just as Pak's assassination kept the lid on a boiling cauldron in November and December, the repeal of Emergency Decree Number Nine and Kim Dae Jung's release in February kept the lid on in March and most of April.¹¹ General Chun, fearing that Kim Dae Jung would capture the initiative, declared himself KCIA director, kicking off a storm of protests. But the event that really blew the lid off the pot was the April 21st Sabuk riot. At the Sabuk coal mine in Kangwondo province, 3,000 coal miners violently seized the factory and stormed the entire city of Sabuk, holding its 52,000 citizens willing hostages. Uniquely, the miners seized the city's armories and held the Seoul riot police at bay. To the surprise of everyone in Korea, the government gave in to their demands. The victory of the coal miners sparked new labor strikes in Seoul, Inchon, Kwangju, Pusan, Taegu, and Masan, that is, every major industrial city in the country. The labor strikes were quickly compounded by nationwide student demonstrations demanding free elections, an end to Martial Law, Chun and Shin's resignations, academic freedom and labor rights.¹²

The national convulsions lasted for over two weeks when, in a surprise move on May 17th, DRP head Kim Jong Pil announced that Martial Law would be lifted in the National Assembly on the 20th, and Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam issued a joint statement calling for the resignation of Chun Doo Hwan and Prime Minister Shin Hyon Hwack and also for elections by the end of the year. Satisfied with these developments, the students called off all demonstrations.

The Uprisings

The situation, from Washington's point of view, was clearly out of control. Lieutenant General Chun seized the quiet of May 18 and imposed Emergency Decree Number Ten. The nation's major universities were stormed and all student leaders were arrested. At 4 a.m. on the 19th, he re-arrested Kim Dae Jung* and Kim Jong Pil and most of the DRP and NDP leaders. In the afternoon of the 19th, he

¹⁰. In the mid-1970s, Kim Dae Jung was viewed by many as a viable pro-U.S. alternative to Pak. He has moved more to the left with intervening years.

¹¹. The repeal of Emergency Decree Number 9 was largely cosmetic and was viewed as such by the Korean people. Martial Law, the National Security Law and the Anti-Communist Law are so sweeping in their nature that they make even the most neanderthal definition of personal, civil and economic human rights an impossibility.

¹². The role of Korean students is largely misunderstood in the West. It is considered their historical responsibility to demonstrate against the evils of society. When Korean students march, they do so with the blessing of their parents. Unlike Western students, when Koreans demonstrate, they don't know whether they will be coming home—ever. Survivors of a losing campaign can be tortured or put in the army. Their families will also pay a price. The fact that they are students is all they have in common with their Western counterparts.

*Subsequent to the submission of this article, Kim Dae Jung was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. An appeal is pending, and worldwide protests against the impending execution of Kim have come from dozens of countries. [Editor's note.]

arrested Kim Young Sam and, using the 300,000 troops under Korean command, occupied Seoul, Inchon, Swon, Taejon, Taegu, Masan, Pusan, Chunju and Kwangju. In short, he blanketed the country with troops and police and put thousands of Koreans in prison.

That week in Seoul, Martial Law troops were everywhere. Squads of three troops patrolled up and down each street; troops sat at every major intersection in the city. Several busloads of troops were stationed at the train and bus terminals, with empty buses behind them waiting to be filled with anyone who attempted a demonstration. Every government office had two tanks parked in front of it. All broadcasting stations, newspaper offices and banks were guarded. People walking down the street were randomly stopped and searched. Whole blocks were sealed off and searched.

On the 18th of May, some very brave citizens and students in Kwangju organized against this repressive crackdown with a demonstration that resulted in a number of deaths. On the 19th, the demonstrators returned to the



More Victims' Bodies

streets. General Chun, a bit shorthanded to deal with the Kwangju problem, appealed to Defense Secretary Harold Brown for military assistance. Brown granted his request for U.S. equipment and use of Korean troops under U.S. command.¹³ The 70,000 troops requested had to be taken off the DMZ, but their redeployment was covered by U.S. troops and an aircraft carrier that had been dispatched to Korea. As the Kwangju rebellion spread throughout the North and South Cholla provinces, the troops were de-

¹³. *New York Times*, May 23, 1980, "Brown Release of Troops to Chun Disclosed."

ployed in a fashion that encircled the cities of Kwangju, Mogpo, Naju, Yosu, Hwason and Chunju.

On the night of the 19th, Chun sent 3,000 paratroopers into Kwangju, apparently with orders to kill. In less than 15 hours, the paratroopers had beaten and bayoneted to death 600 citizens, aged 3 to 80, men, women, children, everybody. By noon, on the 20th, the paratroopers thought they had won. But, at that point, the city taxi drivers turned on the troops as 300,000 citizens poured into the streets. The fighting lasted for 24 hours before the citizens seized the city's armories (4,000 weapons) and forced the troops out. The Kwangju battle would last for 9 days in all, leaving as many as 2,000 citizens dead and 15,000 seriously injured. Mogpo, Kim Dae Jung's hometown, held out for one month. The death toll there, and in Chunju, Hwason, Naju and Yosu, is unknown.



Korean Soldier and Captured Youth

U.S. Support

The Cholla Do Massacre was a unique chapter in American diplomatic annals as well as Korean history. General Chun made no bones about it on May 30, 1980, when he publicly stated that Ambassador Gleysteen had encouraged his brutality for the sake of social stability. Oddly, the Administration did not even issue a public denial of Chun's statement. As State Department spokesman David Passage said, "We believe this [rebellion] was a major breakdown of law and order. Our situation, for better or for worse, is that Korea is a treaty ally, and the U.S. has a very strong security interest in that part of the world."¹⁴

14. *Milwaukee Journal*, August 12, 1980, "Trio Dispute Death Toll in Korean Strife."

Less than two weeks after the Kwangju massacre, the Carter Administration, in Venice, pushed six billion dollars of financial assistance for the next two years through international funding groups. U.S. behavior thus lent a great deal of credibility to Chun's May 30th statement.

From Washington, it's all so abstract, but not to me. I watched for over two years as even the most remedial national aspirations of Koreans were smashed by Korean and American authorities in Seoul. The misery is real. The censorship is real. The slave labor is real. The abject poverty is real. The torture camps are real. The atmosphere of terror is real, and the overwhelming sense of hopelessness is real.¹⁵ When I went to Korea in 1978, it was a police state serving American strategic interests primarily as a buffer for and a mode of maintaining stability in Japan. When I left Korea, on June 10, 1980, it was a concentration camp serving the same interests.

To quote Kim Chi Ha, a famous Korean poet serving life imprisonment for his opposition to the regime: "The government constantly asserts that the threat from North Korea is so serious that civil rights are an impermissible luxury. But a corrupt, immoral dictatorship is the greatest spur to communism. What greater argument do the communists have than the Pak [or Chun] regime? Dictatorial rule will never make South Korea secure. A country is strong and viable only when its people are defending their freedom. If we have no basic rights or representative government, what is there for us to defend? Our hopeless privation and disease, our endless despair and humiliation? Are we to risk our lives for these?"¹⁶

After watching President Carter's acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in August, the obvious answer to Kim's question is yes, the Korean people are to risk their lives for hopeless privation, disease, humiliation and despair. This year, Carter has in effect broadened his definition of human rights to include the sanctity of bayonetting children as long as it is done to maintain "consistency, moderation and stability"¹⁷ in America's world position. We wouldn't want to send out signals of weakness. After all, we don't have to live in South Korea.

15. See "Human Rights in the Republic of Korea," Background Information, Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, 150 route de Ferney, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland. (022) 98 94 00.

16. From "A Declaration of Conscience" by Kim Chi Ha, published in "Letters From South Korea," page 406, Iwanami Shoten Publishers, Tokyo, Japan.

17. President Carter, in a news conference, February 14, 1980.

Cover photograph and photographs illustrating this article copyright © 1980, by David Dolinger. These photographs were taken by Dolinger, another former Peace Corps volunteer, in Kwangju, on May 20, 1980. He notes: "These pictures were taken at the beginning of Seo Dae, that is the 20th of May, Buddha's birthday. I didn't take any more, because the people asked me not to. During the Pusan demonstrations last year, the government got its hands on film and pictures taken, and blew them up to identify demonstrators." These photos were never seen by Korean authorities.

The KCIA

by Carolyn Turbyfill

Function

Among the KCIA's more famous exploits are the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung from Japan in 1973 and the bribing of U.S. Congressmen in "Koreagate." But, what the KCIA does best is terrorize the Korean people. Its job is intimidation of the people to make them paranoid and distrustful of everyone, and therefore unable to communicate their common desires and complaints, unable to organize and act. Those who defy this intimidation are arrested and tortured. Friends and family of dissidents are often harassed or arrested and tortured too. The ostensible reason for arresting family members and friends of dissidents is to get information, but the true purpose is to punish the guilty party and to deter other brave persons who are willing even to die for their principles, but who will not risk the possibility that loved ones will be made to suffer for their actions. The KCIA, which in 1978 was referred to as a "friendly foreign intelligence service" by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, is as insidious, brutal and despised as the SAVAK was in Iran, the DINA in Chile, or the Gestapo in Nazi Germany.



Kwangju Wounded in Makeshift Hospitals

Tactics

These tactics are not restricted to the KCIA, and are also employed, to one degree or another, by the Korean National Police, the Korean Military Police, and the Defense Security Command (military intelligence).

Carolyn Turbyfill is another former Peace Corps volunteer in South Korea, who, along with Steven Hunziker and others have spoken out against what they saw and learned during their two years there.

1. Torture

Thorough descriptions of individual cases are documented in the references at the end of this article. All of the standard techniques are employed: beating; electric shock; sharp objects forced under fingernails; sleep deprivation; stick leg torture—making a person squat with a thick stick behind the knees and tramping on the thighs; water torture—one variation is hanging a person upside down, plugging the nose and then pouring alternately very hot or very cold water in the mouth and ears; "Genghis Khan cooking"—hanging a person upside down just above a burning flame; stripping a person naked, putting them in urine and bloodsoaked fatigues, followed by non-stop interrogation and torture with lighted cigarettes; sexual assault; and stomping with boots. Drugs and psychological torture are also used. After arrest and interrogation, detainees are forced to sign a statement saying that torture has not been used and agreeing not to discuss what happened while they were under arrest. Usually, they must also sign a statement pledging not to engage in any political activities, legal or not, and are subject to immediate arrest without a warrant should they violate any of these "agreements." People are frequently arrested and imprisoned for 15 days. This allows 3 to 5 days for interrogation and torture followed by 10 days for the evidence of torture to heal.



Amnesty International reported that one prisoner, Soh Sung, completely healthy when arrested, was badly burned on the face and ears during KCIA torture. His fingers were burned to a lump, and before he was brought to "trial," he had to put a "print" on official documents with his toes.

2. Terror

The KCIA is not surreptitious when it engages in surveillance, the purpose being to intimidate, not to gain

information. The KCIA is everywhere and strives to make people think that it is even where it isn't. A recent example occurred during and after the Kwangju uprising which lasted from May 17-27. In Seoul, taxi drivers were taking anyone who mentioned Kwangju, or who otherwise made politically unacceptable remarks in a taxi, straight to the nearest police station. Taxi drivers weren't doing this out of loyalty. They were told that they would be tested by KCIA agents who would say illegal things in taxis. If the driver didn't turn the KCIA agent in, the driver would be arrested. So taxi drivers turned people in out of self-defense. Even before General Chun's takeover, during the Pak regime, university professors had the same problem with university students, some of whom are KCIA informants.

All foreigners who are residents of South Korea have a KCIA agent or a policeman assigned to watch them. Monthly visits are the norm, as are visits to Korean friends of the foreigner. This can be escalated to constant surveillance if the subject's activities do not meet with the approval of the government. Should more drastic action be deemed necessary, Korean friends of the foreigner are threatened. Deportation is rarely employed as South Korea is very sensitive about its international image.

3. Disruption

Creating tensions among dissidents is another tactic. During the Kwangju uprising the student leaders were in the provincial office working with two other citizens groups and running the city. (Contrary to U.S. State Department comments characterizing Kwangju as "a breakdown in law and order," the city was well run and orderly while the citizens were in control of it.) In the provincial office, a KCIA agent stabbed one of the student leaders, but the students caught him. He was trying to make it appear as if there was conflict among the student leaders. This time, the tactic failed.

4. Discrediting

The KCIA is always trying to make dissidents, whether they be students, intellectuals, Christians, workers or farmers, look like communists or rowdy hoodlums. Over the last two years, practically every time students and other citizens have turned out in large numbers to have a peaceful demonstration, someone has thrown a few molotov cocktails. It has gotten to the point that the cocktails are expected, and everyone assumes that it is the KCIA up to its old tricks. Usually, KCIA tactics are transparent enough. The Korean people can see through them as easily as they can see through the outrageous sedition charges leveled against Kim Dae Jung.

The Staff

The KCIA is 30,000 strong. This does not count informants; the Defense Security Command; the Korean National Police; the Korean Military Police; or U.S., Japanese and West German intelligence operatives, (mas-

querading as embassy personnel, Department of the Army civilians, businessmen, missionaries, tourists, academics, journalists, and retired military personnel). All this for a country of 37 million people.

The lowest ranking KCIA officers make 80,000 won a month, \$133.00. This is supplemented by bribes, free meals, free taxi rides, etc. Income rises with rank. The highest ranking officials are millionaires, like Kim Jong Pil who founded the KCIA with U.S. assistance in 1961, and Lee Hu Rak who engineered the Kim Dae Jung kidnapping and masterminded Koreagate while he was Director of the KCIA. (Lee Hu Rak was in the U.S. this spring until the end of March for "dental treatment." As good dental care is available in Korea, it is widely believed that he was hiding out until the political climate at home became more favorable).

In the spring of 1980, after Pak's death, while it was uncertain who would end up in charge, lower level KCIA officials and other government officials were fence-sitting. They carried out their official duties but were fearful of offending anyone who could conceivably end up on the winning side of the struggle for control of the country. Morale was low as purges for corruption were begun, first by the ruling Democratic and Republican Party head Kim Jong Pil, and then by Chun Doo Hwan who gave Kim Jong Pil a taste of his own medicine by arresting him for corruption. In truth, loyalty and not corruption was the motive behind the purges. Chun Doo Hwan replaced 300 top KCIA officers with his own proteges; the number of lower ranking officers replaced has not been publicly disclosed. Probably few needed replacing. All that is required from lower ranking officers is obedience to authority, and for most them, any authority would do.

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An Insider's Views:

PORTUGAL:

REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION

INTERVIEW WITH A PARTICIPANT

Early this year, Steve Talbot, an editor of the International News Bulletin, filmmaker and free-lance journalist—the author of "The CIA and BOSS: Thick as Thieves," in *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*—interviewed, with the promise of confidentiality, a very high-ranking Portuguese military officer. The text of the interview follows; a few omissions have been made of comments which would identify the speaker.

Q. What were your military experiences in Africa which caused you to become involved in the April 1974 revolution that overthrew the Caetano dictatorship?

A. I served 12 years in the military in Guinea-Bissau. I saw the process of decolonization. I participated in many of the most famous battles.

The war was complicated because it involved not just Portuguese vs. African, but African vs. African as well. The decolonization process was difficult because it involved the disarming of thousands of Africans as well as a withdrawal of the Portuguese army.

During the war years, we tried to fight an intelligent war. Why are the Africans fighting us, I would ask. Are we really a civilizing force? I came to the conclusion that only a dialogue with the PAIGC would work. But Caetano did not want a political defeat.

Caetano's resistance to decolonization and peace through dialogue made me recall what had happened to the Portuguese possessions in India: Goa and two others. Goa had been considered the "Rome of the East" but really it had no use at all; it only had a spiritual or symbolic significance. Since 1954 there had been a guerrilla war against Portuguese rule in India. Then in December 1961 Nehru decided to invade all three territories. Portugal had 3,500 troops plus some Indian auxiliaries. Salazar told his general: "victory or death," you know, fight to the last man. But the general wasn't that stupid, and he surrendered. After the colonial troops surrendered, Lisbon left its own citizens stranded in Indian prisons. The soldiers—when they finally returned—were marched into Lisbon under guard supposedly to prevent hostile attacks by the Portuguese people. Our commanders in Goa were secretly tried and sacked. A few were decorated. Why some were fired and

some were decorated we never knew. These people, incidentally, were rehabilitated only after April 25 and were reintegrated into the army.

I feared a repetition of this sordid episode in Guinea. I knew that the fascist politicians would blame our defeat and the loss of the colony on the military. Of course, their real plan was to let go of Guinea and even Mozambique when they were forced to militarily, but to hold on to Angola. Angola was the richest, the largest, and the easiest to govern because there were only six million people in the country and 600,000 of them were Portuguese; this was quite a lot for a settler population, many more than Rhodesia.

Because we knew this was the politicians' plan, we—the captains' movement and others—began to consider overthrowing the Portuguese government.

We wanted a civilized decolonization by dialogue with the liberation movements instead of a prolonged bloody war which would end in military defeat. And we knew it was important to turn over control to the genuine liberation movements and not the phantom parties that popped up in the colonies at the last minute.

Q. Militarily, what was the turning point in the war in Guinea-Bissau?

A. That type of war, guerrilla, war, favors the insurgents because they can, for instance, launch surprise attacks at night. Based in the countryside, the guerrillas were able to isolate the Portuguese garrisons. But Portugal did have an air force which controlled the skies. However, in 1972-73, the guerrillas received SAM missiles from the East. That forced our planes to fly at very high altitudes with less accurate bombing or to fly at very low altitudes where a pilot can't really see targets on the ground. That was a turning point.

Q. What was your sense of the relationship between the guerrillas and the population?

A. In Guinea there are many ethnic groups. The villages are separate like old feudal towns in Europe. Many Africans were regrouped into strategic hamlets. This posed problems for the PAIGC [the African Party for the

Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde]. It was also a great problem for the PAIGC to try to win over the Africans who had become parasites living off the Portuguese army. Now in the liberated areas it was different. There people worked freely in the countryside, or they lived in underground shelters. There was close contact between the people and the guerrillas. In urban areas, there were many clandestine PAIGC militants.

Q. Who killed Amilcar Cabral?

A. I prefer not to discuss the assassination of Cabral. [Long pause.] It was complicated. But I can tell you it was not the Portuguese army. Many Portuguese army officers had come to admire Cabral. It could have been PIDE [the Portuguese Intelligence Service]. But why wasn't the assassination intercepted, I ask myself. Other assassination attempts had been stopped.

Q. Some people believe that the murder was instigated by foreign forces and perhaps PIDE, trying to exacerbate differences between the Cape Verdeans and the Guineans in the movement, and that the object was to remove the Marxist leadership.


A. It was not Cape Verdeans versus the Guineans. That is a smokescreen. I don't think it was foreign forces, such as the CIA. Remember, the man who murdered Cabral had just been released from a Portuguese concentration camp. He could have been instigated by PIDE. It could have been a personal grudge.

Q. What impact did the war in Vietnam, especially the failure of the U.S. military there, have on the Portuguese colonial army?

A. The war in Guinea was very hard but it was always conducted by the PAIGC without hate, which is very important in a revolutionary war. Churchill once said the the American revolution was the last war between gentlemen. But I disagree. I think the war in Guinea was a war between gentlemen. There were atrocities committed by the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, but this did not happen in Guinea. Guinea has an extremely hot and humid climate. This had a calming effect on the Portuguese soldiers. Our soldiers did not use drugs like the Americans in Vietnam. [Pause, laughs.] Our drug, I guess, is wine. Most common soldiers did not even know there was a war in Vietnam. I am afraid that the general Portuguese intellectual level is low and that it was deliberately kept that way for years by fascist governments. Twenty years ago Portugal had a 45% illiteracy rate. Even today the vast majority of our people never really read or write after they leave school, except for newspapers. Comics and photo novels were the only reading material of most of the Portuguese soldiers. They didn't learn about Vietnam. But among sergeants and in the higher ranks, I would say that most were opposed to the U.S. war in Vietnam. You see, the rich avoided the draft in Portugal. But it was not the policy of the Portuguese Communist Party to refuse the draft. The Communist Party members within the army educated others about things like Vietnam; they enlightened the soldiers. In the sergeants' or the officers' mess, there were always several people who could argue effectively against the Vietnam war.

Q. Could you describe the nature and extent of any American involvement in the Portuguese colonial war in Guinea-Bissau? Any CIA involvement?

A. I'll tell you a story. In 1970, in one of those stupidities we Portuguese were good at, a naval invasion of Guinea-Conakry was organized by PIDE in Guinea-Bissau. A fake front of dissident Guineans opposed to Sekou Toure was set up. It was a fiasco. Sekou Toure and Amilcar Cabral were both gone when our troops arrived in Conakry. A tape - pre-recorded -- was supposed to be played on the radio station appealing for Portuguese military intervention, but it was never broadcast because our agent was too nervous to be able to put the cassette in properly. Our naval flotilla was damaged. We were supposed to destroy the Russian MIGs in Conakry but they had been moved, and besides, we didn't know at the time that there were no pilots in Guinea to fly the MIGs anyway. So instead of pulling off a coup against Sekou Toure, who was supporting Cabral and the PAIGC, we were only able to free some Portuguese prisoners. This invasion was probably planned in Geneva where the front had a headquarters and where PIDE was active. After failing in the coup attempt, the rationale for



the invasion became one of freeing Portuguese prisoners. Now the result of this botched invasion of ours was to force Guinea closer to the Russians and to give the Russians more of a military presence in West Africa. The United States had previously had the edge because of its base in Dakar. Now thanks to this Portuguese invasion, the region was militarily neutralized—the Russians had a base and the Americans had a base. [See Lawrence, "PIDE and SDECE: Plotting in Guinea," in *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*—Eds.]

As far as I know, U.S. involvement in Guinea-Bissau was limited. I think the Americans were mainly interested in Cape Verde as an air base and so on. The United States tried to separate Cape Verde from Guinea. U.S. intelligence operations probably used the Lebanese community in Guinea for information, etc.

Q. Didn't the U.S. also supply Portugal with weapons like napalm through NATO?


A. Yes, we used American weapons in Guinea-Bissau, including napalm.

Q. Did you use U.S. anti-personnel bombs?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you explain the *coup* attempts of General Spinola?

A. In October 1974 the last troops left Guinea-Bissau and I returned to Lisbon. On September 28, 1974, Spinola tried a *coup*. He tried to rally what he called the "silent majority." But the Armed Forces Movement and the popular masses closed off Lisbon with barricades, prevented the Spinola rally from taking place, stopped the *coup*, and forced Spinola to resign from the presidency. I discovered that Spinola was afraid of the people and revolution. He had to be the head, the conductor of the orchestra, while the people had to remain passive. I supported democracy and an active population. Spinola was fond of saying, in private, "Democracy is the art of getting people to do what we want them to do."



Q. What about the next time, March 11, 1975, when Spinola tried to stage another *coup*?

A. The right was attempting to create an atmosphere of violence and chaos which would justify its intervention. One extreme rightwing group, the Portuguese Liberation Army (ELP) was operating from Spain. Everywhere there were rumors of a coming *coup*. But from where? when? A

psychological climate of fear and disorder was created. I blame the PPD and Sa Carneiro [now Prime Minister—Eds.] for much of this. I think there is a connection between the PPD and the ELP. The man who conspired to lead the March 11 *coup* wanted a return to fascism but accepted support from others who just wanted to stop the left.

That period was like a corked champagne bottle ready to pop. It was a time of ferment, debate, violence. There were demonstrations but no one was in control. The Communist Party tried to stop strikes, restore order, but it was too small to be effective and was still in the process of adapting from its old clandestine structures to being an open party and part of the government.

To give an idea of how crazy the climate was: the rumor spread that the left had compiled an assassination list with 1,500 names on it, including mine! And it was said that the Tupamaros had been brought into Portugal as hit men. I believe that the French secret service spread this rumor.

After the failure of March 11, Spinola, of course, escaped. He fled first to Tanques and then to Brazil. Somebody very important must have helped him get away, but I don't know who for sure. Maybe it was the SDECE [the French intelligence service], maybe the CIA. After March 11 the Junta of National Salvation was dissolved and replaced by the Council of the Revolution. On March 12 a mass meeting was called by the left. It was a stormy meeting. That led to the nationalization of the banks and other acts. The Council of the Revolution was expanded to 24 members elected by the Armed Forces Movement and included the president, the commanders of the three branches of the military, etc.

Q. After March 11 it seems the left was in the ascendancy and close to power. Yet November 25, 1975 was a turning point; the right began to reassert itself.

A. Divisions began to emerge within the Armed Forces Movement and the Council of the Revolution with different factions putting forth different blueprints for the future development of the country. I thought the COPCON document, calling for a socialist Portugal, was unrealistic. On the economic and social level it might be alright for Portugal to go its own way. But on the strategic level we were like children playing in a garden. The superpowers control the setup.


The Melo Antunes group said Portugal should align itself with the Third World. The split between COPCON and Melo Antunes was a division in our movement that was an opportunity for the right. Otelo de Carvalho supported the COPCON document, but also supported the Melo Antunes document.

Q. The events of November 25 are controversial. Was it really a leftwing *coup* attempt or was it something instigated by the right to discredit the left and justify a crackdown on the left?

A. Remember that Angola became independent on November 11, 1975. The Angolan situation had had a positive influence on the situation in Portugal. The right wanted to

preserve the situation in Portugal, that is, avoid a *coup* until after November 11. People were getting sick of the turmoil in our country. After November 11 a consensus developed: Portugal had to be put in order. The PPD was the force behind November 25. PPD supporters cut off water to Lisbon to create panic. The PPD was backing a rightwing general from the north, Pires Veloso. Meanwhile, Melo Antunes' group of nine and the Socialist Party began to mobilize in order to try to preempt the rightwing *coup* which we were all expecting. At the same time the radical left convinced itself that it had power and a mass following. A united revolutionary front was formed. There were demonstrations in Lisbon. When the Communists joined in there were 150,000 people. Without the Communist Party, the far left had only 8,000. The rumor spread that Otelo wanted to take over. But the far left taking power or even the Communists taking power was never the issue. November 25 was a choice between Melo Antunes and the Socialist Party on one hand and the PPD and the right on the other.

Now as to the details of the paratroopers' revolt. The parachutists' officers had left their own units because they were fed up with the indiscipline in the ranks. It was unpardonable for these officers to abandon their posts. After they left, someone persuaded the paratroopers to revolt. It might have been the radical left in COPCON, but there were probably rightwing instigators, too. For instance, one lieutenant who was a leader of the revolt and supposedly a leftist has now become a member of the CDS, a rightwing party. But seizing the paratrooper base was meaningless: all the planes had already been removed to NATO bases in the north which were under rightwing military control. The paratroopers seized an empty base! Then they demanded that the Air Force commander resign. The Council of Revolution arrested all the officers and cracked down on the unit.



Incidentally, in all this political maneuvering in the center and right, the CIA supported Melo Antunes and the Socialist Party. Sa Carneiro never forgave the U.S. for this.

You know the famous remark by Kissinger was that Portugal was lost to the Communists, but Carlucci said, "No, I can save it." Carlucci [then U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, now Deputy Director of the CIA—Eds], was a great friend of the rightwing general Veloso. The CIA was mainly backing the Socialists at this time but it had a finger in every pie. Carlucci was a terrible menace. You know he had been kicked out of Zanzibar for plotting against the government. After March 11, Otelo went on TV and blamed Carlucci for involvement in the attempted *coup*.

Otelo said he could not guarantee Carlucci's safety. But politically we did not have the force to get rid of Carlucci. That is the hard truth of living in a small country. Carlucci had complete freedom. His power grew. Before November 25 people who supported the right and the U.S. were afraid to go to parties at the U.S. Embassy, but afterwards people were bribing secretaries to get invitations. They were no longer afraid of being associated publicly with the U.S. and Carlucci. Carlucci was effective. He speaks very good Portuguese and had been in Brazil previously.

Q. What do you think of the current political situation in the country?

A. The current situation in Portugal is very bad because basic principles of democracy are not practiced. There is formal democracy now, but no real democracy. A witch-hunt is under way. The army is being purged. The amnesty law has not been applied by the military hierarchy. People's requests for consideration under the amnesty law are not even answered. In general, people on the left are being isolated, removed. There is no possibility of justice in the courts. This country has a history of Inquisition. Incidentally, you know that the Inquisition was a political weapon aimed against Jews, but it was also the feudal nobility protecting itself against the growing bourgeoisie of merchants, artisans, the literate urban dwellers. They obliged all Jews to convert, to be baptized as "New Christians," but they burned them anyway. And all the time this hideous Inquisition was all carried out according to the letter of the law. Portugal's legal and political system has 500 years of experience in these matters. First, they decide to burn or condemn or remove someone, they figure out what specific charges to bring. And, as you know from watching our antiquated courts in action, there is no written record of any trial! And that means that there can never be an appeal on the facts.


The revolution of April 25 failed to deal with the Portuguese legal system--this was a real shortcoming. Why didn't we change things? We did not want European countries to condemn us, to condemn military men for intervening in the legal system.

Portuguese judges are supreme. They decide cases before they are tried. And there is no popular reaction to court scandals because they happen all the time.

In the current political climate, the rightwing gets away with anything. For example, a military officer of low moral character who is involved with ELP terrorists. He strangled his lover; her bloody blouse was found in his car. He was nevertheless let out on bail—no money, just his promise to return. But he fled. In his absence he was tried and acquitted. This happened just a few days ago.

Q. Could you tell us more about CIA and other foreign intelligence operations in Portugal?

A. Between April 25, 1974 and 1976, there was no Portuguese intelligence service in operation because we had disbanded PIDE, the notorious secret police. But we did not create an alternative. So our small country was wide open to the CIA, which operated from the Sheraton Hotel in



Lisbon, the KGB, which operated from the Hotel Ritz, the French, the British, etc. In addition to these foreign operations there was a large increase in drug dealing, diamond smuggling, and other examples of international crime.

Q. The Council of Revolution, at least on paper, is still the supreme body in Portugal. Does it still have any power?

A. The Council has been neutralized by internal conflict. It still can rule on the constitutionality of laws. That's about all it can do.

Q. Is there a formal mechanism to compel the military to implement the amnesty law?

A. No, that is the problem.

Q. Otelo de Carvalho is organizing a coalition of independent and far leftist parties to campaign for the October elections. Do you support him? What are his chances?

A. I have very serious doubts about Otelo's political campaign. Political parties should represent social strata. For example, the CDS and other rightwing parties today represent the elite of the 16th and 17th centuries—the landowning nobility. The newer, less reactionary parties of the right represent the powerful middle class of capitalists. The Communist Party represents the interests of the still relatively small industrial workers. An important question in Portugal today is who will command the allegiance of the petty bourgeoisie? Historically, the petty bourgeoisie is the most revolutionary class in Portugal. It has been a very combative class ever since 1385, when it challenged the king. It was the first bourgeoisie in the world. In 1385 a king died and the petty bourgeoisie elected a king and a new dynasty started. But seven years later this king betrayed his people.

In the last elections in December 1979, the petty bourgeoisie moved from left to right and were responsible for the election of the present conservative government. In earlier elections, 1976, they had voted for the Socialist Party. These bakers, officer workers, bank clerks, shopkeepers are numerous in Portugal and hold the balance between the contending political forces. The game of the petty bourgeoisie will determine the future of Portugal. It will be very dangerous if the progressive forces do not win the next elections in October. If we lose, the right will consolidate its position. I don't see the radical left, a real minority—which Otelo is trying to organize—having much

of an impact. [The rightists, led by Sa Carneiro, won the October 1980 elections—Eds.]

Q. What are your thoughts about the future?

A. I support the sensible left. We need order and progress in Portugal. If there is constant turmoil and disorder, I am afraid that the people will tire of it. The right gets its way by fomenting chaos and then stepping in to establish "order."

Savimbi and the Portuguese Connection

The MPLA has long insisted that Jonas Savimbi and UNITA actively collaborated with the Portuguese army during the colonial war in Angola. After April 25, 1974—the coup in Portugal—correspondence between Savimbi and Portuguese military officers was published in the Paris monthly, *Afrique-Azie*, and in Portuguese newspapers. The letters reportedly had been removed from government files and were blatantly incriminating.

During a recent trip to Portugal, where I interviewed a number of veterans of the colonial wars and members of the Armed Forces Movement, I inquired about the Savimbi-Portugal connection. A captain who had served in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau in a special commando unit (the equivalent of the Green Berets) told me that he was part of a detachment which had once surrounded Savimbi and his guerillas in central Angola. Before moving in for the capture, the captain recalled, his unit radioed headquarters to pass on the good news. To his surprise, the Portuguese high command ordered his unit to withdraw and let Savimbi escape.

This story is more than an interesting historical anecdote. During the 1975-76 war in Angola, Savimbi's UNITA was aided by the CIA and South Africa. The CIA/South African support for Savimbi—countered by Cuban and Soviet assistance to the MPLA—was a disaster. But just last Fall, Savimbi visited New York and Washington, sponsored by Freedom House and the Social Democrats, U.S.A., appealing for renewed U.S. aid. With pressure building in Washington to "take the wraps off the CIA" and renew covert operations which would harass the Cubans and Soviets in Africa, Savimbi—in the opinion of columnist William Safire and the editors of the *Wall Street Journal*—would be an excellent candidate for CIA support. But renewed CIA backing for such a widely discredited, opportunistic figure (Savimbi has a dismal reputation in most of Africa because of his continuing reliance on South Africa for weapons and supplies) would only be a repeat of the 1975-76 fiasco for the U.S. in Angola.

—Steve Talbot

The Coronation of a President

On October 6, 1980, Guyanese Prime Minister Linden Forbes Burnham "promulgated" the fraudulent Constitution described in our last issue, and was sworn in as Guyana's "Executive President," a post which he holds, in the words of the Constitution, "as if he were elected thereto."

The virtually unlimited powers of the new office and recent trappings affected by Burnham make the above-mentioned ceremony one of royal enthronement, and in fact a "coronation week" broadcast by the notorious Rabbi Washington of the deadly House of Israel cult praised the event as the "crowning of the Executive President."

The new presidency is replete with royal symbols, chief among them the adoption of an official presidential standard. This royal flag of office as proclaimed by Burnham looks like this:



The obvious Obeah overtones of the crocodile and palm merit comparisons to the days of Papa Doc in Haiti and to the practices of ritualistic murder and mysticism of ousted Grenadian dictator Eric Gairy. Like their examples, Burnham's rule is perpetuated by fear and force of arms. Burnham's version of the Ton-Ton Macoute and the Mongoose Gang, the Death Squad and the House of Israel, are rapidly replacing professional elements in the police ranks, particularly at the rank of inspector.

The latest component in the vast extra-police security service appears to be a Somocista-style National Guard, who have recently "pulled rank" to have two of their own released by the police after they attempted to break up a public rally at Kitty Market on October 13, 1980.

However, Obeah and goon squads are not apparently enough for the presidential crocodile. A team of four British "security consultants" has been in the country for six weeks, staying at the luxurious Pegasus Hotel on weekends and spending the week with police elements. The security group is apparently responsible for the elaborate "coronation" security arrangements which saw snipers posted on rooftops and sophisticated crowd control measures. The U.K. denies that the four are official government representatives, but speculation is rife that the private consulting firm is thin cover for British intelligence security specialists.

The Americans also continue their covert support, the latest effort being the establishment of a "security zone" at a place called Sand Hills in the Berbice District. In at least one case a Guyanese assigned to this top-secret project reported to family and friends that he was leaving the country for a job in Los Angeles, and actually had his mail forwarded to him through Los Angeles, to bolster the cover.

The extra security measures have made further details concerning the purpose of the operation hard to obtain, but presidential security is certainly one purpose. The fortifications were within easy helicopter reach of Georgetown but allow for almost total protection due to the Sand Hills terrain and Guyana's sparse interior regions.

December 15, 1980 has now been set by Burnham as the date for the election exercise that is designed to provide some semblance of legality for his executive position. As that date approaches and as the opposition mounts to the region's new Idi Amin, the true extent and nature of the Sand Hills project may be clarified. —

ERRATA

In our last issue, on page 25, we incorrectly identified the assassin of Walter Rodney as Sgt. Timothy Smith. His correct name is Gregory Smith. Most copies were corrected, but only after the issue has been mailed to our subscribers and many bookstores. We regret this error, which was not the fault of our author, but a proofreading instruction mistake.

In the same article, on page 20, the year of the Joshua Ramsammy shooting was 1971, not 1973. And, on page 21, the figure of U.S. aid to Guyana in 1978 should read \$26.8 million, not \$24.7 million. —

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN "COAST GUARD"

by Jonathan Bloch
and Pat Fitzsimons*

Plans to create an Eastern Caribbean Regional Coast Guard are firming up after two years on the drawing board. Earlier hopes for a unified police command with a residual defense capability have been dropped, and the trend is towards collaboration or mutual defense agreements between islands. Originally conceived to stem supposed growing Cuban influence, and with the Grenadian revolution as an impetus, progress could not have been made without the interest and assistance of the United States and Britain.

Barbados, St. Lucia and St. Vincent are the three primary island governments involved in the plans, though there has been talk of Dominica and of Trinidad and Tobago joining. Recently Barbados contracted to buy a 37-meter armed fast patrol boat from Brooke Marine (UK) with British financial assistance. The contract included construction of a new coast guard headquarters and the refitting and arming of three shrimp trawlers which will be used for permanent offshore surveillance duties. St. Vincent ordered a 25-meter patrol boat from Vosper Thornycroft (UK), also with British financial assistance. No decision appears to have been made yet on the choice of vessel for St. Lucia. These acquisitions are important because the islands lack sophisticated weaponry and small increments can contribute to the sustaining or overthrowing of the governments of the regions.

Planning for a coordinated defense effort began in early 1979 and the idea was discussed between Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados and then British Prime Minister James Callaghan during the latter's visit to Barbados. At that time it was envisaged that British coast guards and servicemen would be lent to the island to help "knit together" the mini-states.

The Grenadian revolution in March 1979 hastened the establishment of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and serious talks began on an integrated regional police force of 120 men with the power to deal with any internal armed threat to elected governments. This plan was dashed in July 1979 after the conservative government in St. Lucia was replaced by a more liberal regime. The new St. Lucian administration made it clear it would not agree to a service designed to intervene to suppress internal unrest among its members. Disagreements emerged over the precise definition of the role and the nature of the force's command structure and its funding. However, all countries, St. Lucia included, remained in agreement in principle with the concept of regional defense.

* Jonathan Bloch and Pat Fitzsimons are British journalists with considerable experience in matters involving British intelligence.

The seizure of Union Island, a St. Vincent dependency, by Rastafarian militants two days after the election of conservative Prime Minister Milton Cato in December 1979, renewed interest in establishing coordinated defense. Vincentian security forces dealt with the uprising while troops sent from Barbados "held the fort" in St. Vincent itself, setting a regional precedent. Afterwards Prime Minister Adams said he would send troops to any other islands which asked, and Barbados went full steam ahead on plans for a joint coast guard in the area.

Britain's interest in the project was summed up by Conservative Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington during his August 1980 visit to Barbados, when he stated that he did not feel there was any external threat to the Caribbean at the time, but there were potential threats of subversion of existing governments which such governments would obviously wish to fight against. He added, "If they ask our help in the development of the training of their police, or help in small ships, or whatever it might be, or in technical assistance of any kind, we shall be ready to consider it."

Britain's "responsibilities" to its ex-colonies are being fulfilled by the \$10 million (U.S.) worth of assistance given to Barbados for the coast guard, making available additional funding for communications coordination undertaken by Barbados, and provision of qualified Royal Navy officers and men to serve side-by-side in the vessels while training coast guard personnel. These were the major recommendations of a British naval team which visited the island shortly after the talks with Callaghan.

United States interest in the Eastern Caribbean increased after the Grenadian revolution, when the possibility of increased Cuban influence was feared. U.S. aid to the region is meant, according to the Department of Defense, to keep it "politically stable and economically viable" and "free from undue outside influence." Assistance for the Regional Coast Guard aims at counteracting the perceived growing Cuban influence and lessening the attraction of Cuban military training. It is also to represent a "tangible U.S. military presence" to fill the gap left when St. Lucia and St. Vincent gained independence and Britain's presence was reduced. The U.S. has also brought pressure on the British government to increase its activity in the region.

U.S. aid packages in 1981 will amount to \$5,084,000 (U.S.) in International Military Education and Training (IMET) and foreign military sales for Barbados, and \$8,000 (U.S.) each in IMET for St. Lucia and St. Vincent. To manage this program a small security team has been stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Bridgetown.

[In light of the position taken by the Defense Department, and the obvious concession that the purposes of the joint coast guard are military, CIA was surprised to hear the response of Sally Shelton, U.S. Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, in a recent speech in Washington. When questioned about the purposes of the joint coast guard, she stressed that they were *not* military, that the vessels were to aid fishermen, and for the three or four yachts that get "caught in a storm" every year. Audience disbelief was evident.]

The United States would like to increase its military assistance by training and equipping the islands' police forces, but this runs counter to existing U.S. law. President Carter's undersecretary of state for security affairs is working on a proposal to induce Congress to change the law. Britain, however, has been advising the Barbadian, St. Lucian and Vincentian governments about the feasibility of establishing a Regional Police College and about police training. The Director of Overseas Police Studies at the Police Staff College, Bramshill, visited the islands with this purpose on behalf of the Overseas Development Ministry in early 1979. Barbados is now upgrading its police facilities by building a new police administrative headquarters and constructing a regional police training college.

The joint coast guard is to supplement the very limited internal security capabilities of the islands. When fully operational it will provide mutual assistance to the governments involved. While Cuba is the ostensible reason, the fear of internal unrest is high on the agenda for the local governments, the United States and Britain.

In August 1980, the right-wing British intelligence think tank, with CIA connections, the Institute for the Study of Conflict, published its 121st Conflict Study, "The Caribbean Strategic Vacuum." The study focused on the usual Institute bogies—the increasing Soviet naval presence in the area; threats to trade and oil routes; Cuba's pivotal role; the Grenadian revolution, and the danger of further subversion; and the need for a positive Western response to these. The study argues that "the preponderant historical relationship of the U.S. with Central and South America virtually ensures that burgeoning local nationalisms must to some extent take on an anti-U.S. character. U.S. naval power . . . is not readily acceptable even to Western-inclined states."

To counter any more Caribbean states moving leftwards and because it believes the U.S. Navy's presence will merely inflame the situation, the Institute proposes the establishment of a local policing force such as was envisioned in 1979 by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. The U.K., it suggests, "would be well advised" to keep a military presence in the Caribbean and the Caribbean countries must develop a capacity to intervene immediately when a duly elected government is threatened.

In the same month, the opposition in Barbados criticized plans to appoint a British naval officer to command the regional coast guard. Opposition to the coast guard is likely to grow as more people in the Caribbean realize who supports it and its real purpose.

Letters

In our last issue, we noted in our Editorial that the proposed Intelligence Identities Protection Act represented a first attempt at an Official Secrets Act. We received a letter from Charles Hansen, the California computer programmer, whose letter to several Senators and newspapers in September 1979 destroyed the government's case against *Progressive* magazine, attempting to suppress the publication of Howard Morland's article on the secrets of the H-bomb. Hansen's letter, and accompanying diagram, proved, as did the Morland article, that the information from which the H-bomb mechanics could be deduced was indeed in the public domain.

We followed the *Progressive* case and the work of Hansen and Morland, and regret that we did not note, in our Editorial, the "born classified" dispute which has raged in the atomic energy field for some time. Hansen's letter to *CovertAction* follows:

"Your statements that 'the danger of the Bills lies in the admitted attempt, for the first time in U.S. history, to criminalize the analysis and publication by private citizens of information gathered from *unclassified* sources,' and that 'For the first time ever, Congress is contemplating passing an Official Secrets Act, trying to make it a crime to publish something which isn't secret in the first place,' are incorrect. Since 1954, there has already been a form of Official Secrets Act, known as the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. §§2014 *et seq.*). Evidently it escaped your notice that the U.S. Department of Energy and the Department of Justice spent over six months last year in an ultimately-futile attempt to prevent the *Progressive* magazine of Madison, Wisconsin, from printing an article on nuclear weapons design. I played a small part in destroying the government's case a year ago this week; since that time, the government has announced its intention to prosecute any other persons daring to reveal unclassified public information without prior DOE permission."

Postscript: MIND CONTROL

In *Bulletin* Number 9, which appeared in early June, we published a lengthy article on mind control. The article indicated a number of areas of research, considered "farcical" by many, where there appeared to be obvious intelligence interest. On June 15, 1980, only several days after our article appeared, the CIA released material dealing with some of its secret research, in response to a *New York Times* Freedom of Information Act request.

A June 16 *Times* article makes it clear that the CIA investigated virtually every area of research mentioned in our article. These included bioplasma fields, electrosleep, psychopharmacology, and, mentioned specifically, the "Backster effect," communication with plants. All of the personnel and organizations involved, with the exception of Mr. Backster's name, were deleted.

AFIO Convention 1980:

Old Soldiers Fade Away . . . Old Spies Lobby

by Louis Wolf

One important facet of the murky world of American espionage is the community of alumni from the alphabet soup of one dozen-plus U.S. intelligence agencies. The Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) held its sixth annual convention on October 3 and 4 in, of all places, McLean, Virginia—a stone's throw from CIA Headquarters. CAIB was at the press table.

Approximately two hundred ex-spoofs attended, from around the country, though predominantly from a 25-mile radius of Washington, D.C. There was an air of clubby, "we were there" festivity, complete with hospitality suite, cash bar, and a sales desk for attendees to purchase AFIO lapel pins, a KGB T-shirt described as "almost authentic," and a "non-computerized survival game" called "People's Democracy." The agenda was filled with the convinced speaking to the convinced. The speakers included Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci, former DDCI (from 1972-76) Vernon Walters, CIA General Counsel Daniel Silver (who moved over from the same post at the National Security Agency), and Air Force Assistant Secretary for Research and Development Robert Hermann.

Carlucci painted a rosy picture of the CIA's current posture, and sought to allay the fears of many AFIO members that the Agency is losing its long-time power and predominance, both within the intelligence "community" as well as in influence upon U.S. international policies and upon the affairs of nations around the globe. He cited three primary areas of concern to the high management at the CIA:

- **Political Support:** While making speeches around the country, the Deputy Director claimed, he had never encountered any hostility and there was "nothing but support" for the CIA. He stated that "never in my experience has our product been in greater demand from the political leaders." (The *never in my experience* reference is of note, since the official version of Carlucci's background is that he first joined the CIA in February 1978, when he was appointed to his present post by President Carter. He could, of course, have been traveling down memory lane, back to the years when he was formally in the Foreign Service in the Congo, Brazil, and Portugal, though his voice laid special emphasis on *never* and *our product*.)

- **Managerial direction:** He represented that an Agency-wide planning system is being erected, and that there has been a revision in personnel planning and evaluation. A "Senior Intelligence Service" has been established for professionals and administrators at the upper levels, apparently to stem the tide of attrition which he said is about 7% annually. Carlucci then declared the CIA had patched up its relations with the Department of State, which over the years have been strained because many legitimate State Department people deeply resent having uncounted numbers of CIA officers infiltrated into their ranks overseas as parallel "diplomats" for purposes of cover.

He was all smiles as he exclaimed magisterially: "We've managed to pursue a very aggressive strategy on the Hill (Capitol Hill is Washington shorthand for Congress); that strategy has paid dividends." Moreover, in what may have been among his most revealing statements, he spoke of the super-secret topic of intelligence budgets, gloating: "We've turned a corner resource-wise." In everyday language, this means that Congress have given the CIA and the rest of the intelligence apparatus all the money it asked for and then some.



Seal of AFIO

- **Recruitment:** Largely thanks to a much-expanded advertising and recruitment campaign, there have been 92,000 job applicants to the CIA in the last fiscal year, of which 1,458 were hired. The two hardest categories of recruitment traditionally were non-whites and engineers, but the DDCI said the Agency is now attracting more of them.

Covert Operations

Carlucci prefaced his sketchy remarks in this most sensitive area by saying that he can't say much about it. Speaking as he was to a gathering of veteran spies, many of whose careers were spent in the Agency's covert operations during the last thirty years, he ventured tentatively: "We're still very effective, not that we ever were not effective." And that was that.

On the subject of books by former intelligence personnel, the Deputy Director blustered: "There are no friendly books." Yet the Agency pointedly decided not to prosecute

Another event at the convention was a panel discussion starring Ladislav Bittman, who spent fourteen years in the Czech intelligence service, and defected to the United States in 1968. He said that he was a coauthor with Dr. Julius Mader of the book published in 1968, "Who's Who in CIA." Despite the fact that his specialty was purportedly disinformation, and that he advocates its use now by the CIA "defensively," he was unable when asked by an AFIO member to think of an example in the last year of disinformation by an Eastern bloc country.

There was also a panel on terrorism, with participants from the FBI and the State Department, and Colonel Jonathan Hall-Tipping, a former director of the British Defense Intelligence Liaison Staff who spent thirty years working in Libya, Hong Kong, Cyprus, Oman, Somalia, Northern Ireland, and London. At the latter post, he was the senior operations officer in liaison with the elite British secret commando warfare organization, the Special Air Service (SAS). The terrorist bombings perpetrated by right-wing groups in Bologna, Italy and Paris just prior to

"I can assure you after the recess, we are going to push harder than ever."

—Frank Carlucci

William Colby, Richard Helms, Ray Cline, David Phillips, the late Peer de Silva, Vernon Walters and other past employees whose books were generally uncritical of the Agency, even if they named many names in the process, while at the same time focusing their prosecutorial attentions on Philip Agee, John Stockwell, Victor Marchetti, and Frank Snepp, whose writings have been more critical of the CIA's operations or have embarrassed the government. CAIB learned during the convention of at least five more books now being written by AFIO members, few if any of which can be expected to be unapproving of their former employer.

The Naming of Names

This was the topic the DDCI attacked most forcefully. "There is no subject about which people in the CIA and I feel more strongly. We see no reason why a group of misguided Americans should be allowed" to name names. After saying that the CIA had gotten "strong support" for the Intelligence Identities Protection Act in the House and Senate intelligence committees, he complained, "We ran up against some problems in the Senate Judiciary Committee." But, he avowed, brazenly, "I can assure you after the [pre-election Congressional] recess, we are going to push harder than ever."

John S. Warner, AFIO's legal counsel who held the same position in the CIA, when discussing the same legislation, heaved a somber sigh and pined, "We realize that we cannot have an official secrets act." It's not for lack of trying though.

the convention forced the panel to acknowledge, though only secondarily, the evil of these acts.

The AFIO As A Lobby

As the AFIO brochure boldly tells it, "AFIO works with Congress." John Warner's dual role as the organization's lawyer and primary legislative mover makes him the brains behind a cunning ongoing campaign to influence Congress. While billing itself as "private" and "non-partisan," AFIO expends considerable energy in the halls of Congress, studiously attending all intelligence-connected hearings, and testifying before the intelligence committees both in formal session and in individual briefings which they frequently render to committee members and staff, over some of whom, at least three different officers bragged, AFIO has a large measure of control. Three telling comments made during the two days were: "We have them (the intelligence committees) curled around our little finger;" "They listen to us;" and "Most of the time, we are on their side and they are on ours."

It is not only the participants in this new-style covert operation to manipulate Congress who say that is what they are doing. During the Kennedy and Johnson era, Charles Maechling, Jr., was in the high-level Special Group (counterinsurgency) chaired by General Maxwell D. Taylor, which coordinated government policy and program in the then booming counterinsurgency industry. In an article highly critical of the CIA's covert operations (*Foreign Service Journal*, June 1980), Maechling refers to

AFIO as "the increasingly vocal lobby of retired intelligence professionals."

The fact that AFIO engages so heavily in lobbying for specific legislation, and has such a smooth working relationship with the committees and certain members in both houses of Congress raises another important question: How does AFIO retain its tax-exempt status?

It must also be recalled that AFIO was initially ARIOS—the R being for retired. Then, in December 1976, after criticism from many of its members who felt this word didn't properly characterize their status in life, "retired" was retired in favor of "former," "to better describe the membership and vitality of the organization," according to AFIO's recruitment brochure. When the only profession one knows is espionage, it is difficult for many to truly retire.

Also worth mentioning is the composition of AFIO, as it sheds valuable light on the inner forces working among the membership. The Summer 1980 issue of *Periscope*, the organization's publication which is "mailed to each member, selected media outlets, certain members of Congress, and key officials of the government," featured the following breakdown of AFIO's membership by their (former) intelligence service. The percentages have been computed by CAIB:

Intelligence Service	Percentage of Total	Number in AFIO
CIA	37%	773
Army	31%	656
Air Force	12%	266
Navy	8%	172
Defense Intelligence Agency	5%	104
FBI	3%	57
National Security Agency	2%	34
Marines	1.4%	30
Department of State	2.6%	14
Total:	100%	2106

AFIO's founder, David Atlee Phillips, a CIA covert operator for fifteen years who was chief of the Agency's Western Hemisphere Division and directed the CIA destabilization program in Chile, gave a closing speech to gathered members. He recalled that last year, headed overseas on a "non-official" trip, he submitted the standard passport application. Though all answers are given under an oath of veracity, Phillips said he lied about his occupation—spy—because he didn't want to face the inevitable questions from curious immigration officials along his way.

After surveying AFIO's five-year history, which he said began in his living room, there was a candid but terse comment on covert operations. "In intelligence the grey area is a very large area."

The problem is undoubtedly much more serious than Free would let on. In the June 1980 *Foreign Service Journal*, Charles Maechling, summed it up like this: "What emerges from recent literature, not to mention the personal experience of many Foreign Service officers, is an unacceptably high proportion of covert action operatives who are alcoholic, violent, and inhabitants of a paranoiac dream-world."

CIA Admits Alcoholism Problem

Many books written about the CIA have referred to the copious consumption of liquor for which spies, like journalists, are famous. Of course, there is a limit to the death and destruction which a drunk reporter can cause; the possibilities stemming from an alcoholic covert operative, however, are not reassuring.

According to the most recent issue of *Alcoholism and Alcohol Education*, published in Washington, D.C., the CIA has finally publicly acknowledged that it has a serious drinking problem in the ranks, though insisting that it is no worse than in society as a whole. David Free, the CIA's "alcoholism coordinator," told a September Department of Defense conference on drug and alcohol abuse that operatives with an alcoholism problem are often taken off "sensitive" operations, though their security clearance "is not automatically lifted."

Free told *A&AE* that an unfit employee is given annual leave; when that runs out, sick leave; and when that runs out, a disability pension, with which, he said, "to drink himself to death." Families, particularly wives, Free noted, are also monitored, and can be "as much security risks as the husbands." The two year old program is supposed not only to treat, but to determine whether people should be transferred to less sensitive positions. But what is most disconcerting is the apparent downplaying of the problem. As Free pointed out, overseas especially, the attitude becomes one of "why get good old Charlie in trouble."



David Atlee Phillips and Lee Harvey Oswald

David Atlee Phillips, one of the founders of AFIO, and its first President, has been accused, quite correctly, over the years of considerable nefarious activities during his long CIA career. Of most significance, perhaps, was his role in the destabilization and ultimate overthrow of the Allende government in Chile, and his supervisory role in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. But recently he has been subjected to some astonishing accusations.

It has been alleged that Phillips was the CIA's case officer for Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged assassin of President John F. Kennedy. It has also been alleged that Phillips was involved in the assassination of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Karpen Moffitt in Washington, DC. These charges have appeared in a book entitled "Conspiracy," by Anthony Summers; at a press conference given by Fred Landis and Donald Freed regarding their new book on the Letelier-Moffitt assassination; in the *New York Daily World*; and, as *CAIB* went to press, in *Washingtonian* magazine.

Phillips sent a mailing to the AFIO membership list of a form letter under the letterhead "Challenge: An Intelligence Officers' Legal Action Fund." Although the name uses the plural, "Officers," the intended beneficiary of this fund is none other than David Atlee Phillips, who says that "a test case should be mounted against writers who defame ex-intelligence officers, dead and alive, by using their names in egregious novels." His, of course, will be the test case, challenging both the Kennedy allegation and the Letelier-Moffitt allegation. Challenge has been established, he notes, because "financing both suits is beyond my financial resources."

Interestingly, he notes that "for a number of reasons, it is best that this effort not be connected with AFIO." Since he has begun his efforts by connecting the venture with AFIO, it is unclear how he will perpetuate this fiction.

He concludes by asking the recipients of the leaflet: "Will you help me launch Challenge? This will be an intelligence officers' legal *action*—not defense—fund. Your contribution will be tax-deductible retroactively, when we receive such status, but that will take time." It will remain to be seen how Phillips will finagle tax-deductible status for an organization created to help him raise expenses for a personal libel suit. The promise of such status "when we receive" it, not "if we receive it," may indeed be unlawful.

Phillips's heavy irony—he notes with relief that he has not been accused "of being involved in the Lincoln assassination"—cannot disguise this rather personal fund-raising effort. His allies in this venture also bear note. The "Advisory Board" (you can be sure that only Phillips will control the funds which are raised) includes former CIA Director William Colby, former Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Robert Cushman, former AFIO president retired Gen. Richard Stilwell, former Inspector General of the CIA Lyman Kirkpatrick, Jr., and former U.S. Senator James Buckley (the brother of Bill).

Phillips, incidentally, has been one of the leaders of the campaign against Philip Agee, writing gleefully in *Periscope*, the AFIO newsletter, of his deportations from various European countries. When *CAIB*'s editors encountered Phillips at the National Press Club book fair last year, we asked him why, since the Justice Department had said there were no charges pending against Agee, the CIA continued to bring pressure on Western governments to deport him. He replied, "Why not?"

CHALLENGE
AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS' LEGAL ACTION FUND
P.O. BOX 34320, BETHESDA, MD. 20034
TELEPHONE (301) 365-2238

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GORDON B. MELTON
GEN. RICHARD STILWELL
USA RET.

CO-TREASURERS
ALFONSO SORIA
WILLIAM W. TING

Dear AFIO-Member,

This letter is being sent to the AFIO membership list; it is an authorized mailing, approved by the Board of Directors in a vote on which I abstained.

On June 8, 1980, a book entitled *Conspiracy*, by Anthony Summers, was published in New York. The author invites, indeed cajoles, the reader to believe that I was CIA's case officer for Lee Harvey Oswald. The theory expounded in the book is that I may have been point man for "a renegade element of U.S. intelligence", and is based on allegations by a Cuban exile. The book conveniently ignores the fact that the Cuban first related his story 27 months after he had been sent to prison, convicted on a narcotics charge. The book also fails to mention that the Cuban claimed that he had been convicted because CIA had framed him.

I was amazed that a reputable house would publish such a monstrous allegation without insisting that their author at least attempt to interview me. On June 12, I consulted an attorney and, despite the thousands of dollars in expenses he anticipated, I decided to sue the publisher and author for libel, and, possibly, slander.

Then, in a June 25 press conference, four "private researchers" declared that I was involved in the assassination of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1976. Working with me in the "cover up" of that murder, they said, were William F. Buckley, Jr., and Ray Cline. Institutionally, CIA, AFIO and Ray's Center for Strategic and International Studies were involved, the ludicrous accusation claimed. (Although there were reporters present, only one newspaper carried the story: *New York World*, successor to *The Daily Worker*).

One of the accusers in the Letelier charge was a Fred Landis. He described himself as a consultant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a claim which the committee denies. Landis noted his connection with *Counter-Spy*. In May, this year, he went to Jamaica to announce CIA involvement in elections there, as Philip Agee did previously. You will recall that on July 1 an editor of the *Covert Action Information Bulletin*—for which Landis has (over)

Sources and Methods

by Ken Lawrence

CIA ASSASSINATIONS Part 2

The pace of political assassination in the world seems to have picked up considerably since the last column on this subject. And quite often the guiding hand of the CIA seems apparent even when the finger on the trigger (or bomb, as the case may be) is someone else's.

The murder of Walter Rodney in Guyana on June 13, the attempt on the life of Grenada's prime minister, Maurice Bishop, six days later, and the wave of terror-killings in Jamaica are only the most recent examples. Meanwhile, new evidence of CIA involvement in past political assassination plots continues to come out.

The greatest amount of press attention was given to this subject when *Time* magazine published an advance excerpt from G. Gordon Liddy's autobiography, *Will*, last April. The story wasn't really news, although the media treated it as a sensational disclosure. Actually it had been revealed originally almost five years ago by reporter Bob Woodward [*Washington Post*, September 21, 1975] during the period when public concern about CIA crimes was at its peak.

According to the old *Post* story, E. Howard Hunt, Jr. "told associates after the Watergate break-in that he was ordered in December, 1971 or January, 1972 to assassinate syndicated columnist Jack Anderson." Anderson was to be killed with a poison "that would leave no trace during a routine medical examination or autopsy."

At the time the story appeared, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church Committee) was conducting its investigation of the intelligence agencies. Hunt and his former White House boss, Charles Colson, were called to testify. Both denied that there had been a plan to kill Anderson, but they agreed that there had been a plan to drug the newsman into incoherence during a public appearance, in order to discredit him.

Hunt testified that Liddy was invited to discuss this plan operationally with a retired CIA physician, but that the doctor indicated so many difficulties involved in surreptitiously administering a hallucinogenic drug that they dropped the whole idea. At that time Liddy wasn't talking; the Church Committee reported there was "no evidence of a plan to assassinate Jack Anderson." [Final Report, Book IV, pages 133-137]

Now Liddy says that, in response to the CIA expert's negative advice on the drugging proposal, "I took the

position that, in a hypothetical case in which the target had been the direct cause of the identification and execution of one of our agents abroad, halfway measures were not appropriate. I urged as the logical and just solution that the target be killed. Quickly.

"My suggestion was received with immediate acceptance." [Anderson denies he has ever revealed the identity of any undercover U.S. intelligence agent.] Hunt and Liddy then went on to discuss the method of assassination. "I submitted that the target should just become a fatal victim of the notorious Washington street-crime rate . . . Afterward, Hunt and I decided to suggest that the assassination of Jack Anderson be carried out by Cubans already recruited for the intelligence arm of the Committee to Re-Elect the President." But if the job were considered "too sensitive" for the Cubans, Liddy would volunteer to do it himself. Later, Hunt told him to forget it, Liddy says.

It is reasonably safe to assume that the Church Committee similarly failed to uncover many other assassination plots involving the CIA.

In June, *Philippine Liberation Courier* and *Ang Katipunan* published new information confirming long-standing suspicions that the CIA had plotted the assassination of Philippine nationalist leader Claro M. Recto, who died in 1960. According to a document in the manuscript collection of the Naval War College, U.S. Ambassador Raymond Spruance and CIA station chief Brig. Gen. Ralph B. Lovett "calmly discussed assassinating Recto in 1954." The document is based on a 1972 interview with Lovett, which goes on to say it was "finally decided not to do this, but the basis of their decision was pragmatic considerations rather than moral scruples."

Earlier this year, investigative reporter Joe Trento reported in detail on a "hit team of Cuban terrorists, involved in at least a dozen murders since 1974," who were "recruited with Central Intelligence Agency help for the secret police of South Africa and Chile" (Wilmington, Delaware, *News Journal*, February 24, 1980).

According to Trento's sources, "the CIA helped form the hit team by arranging introductions for operatives of BOSS and DINA to leaders of the Cuban nationalist movement in Miami and Union City, N.J. In return, DINA killed at least 17 agents of the Cuban Intelligence Service

(Continued on page 32)

NEWS NOTES

China Aiding Indochinese Rightists

In Bulletin Number 5, *Covert Action* presented an overview of the role of U.S. intelligence in Southeast Asia. The author noted that "Following the Nixon administration's opening to China in 1971, the U.S. government found a new partner in China to develop its strategic operations." The U.S. strategy, the "Balkanization" of Indochina, the writer pointed out, called for a "permanent state of war between Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea based on ethnic and border differences. . . ."

A report in the October 18, 1980 *Washington Post* appears to confirm that China is now actively embroiled in this U.S. strategy, separate and apart from its own sabre-rattling border incursions against Vietnam. The dispatch, by John Burgess, entitled "Right-Wing Rebels Aided by China Worry Laotians, Vietnamese," describes some of the many, often tiny, rebel groups fighting primarily in Laos and Kampuchea, though usually based in Thailand. The remnants of CIA-organized and supported "secret armies" are found in most of the groups, along with what remains of the weapons supplied by the CIA and the Pentagon over the years.

But, as Burgess points out, "resistance leaders are turning to China" for assistance. China has directed the Pol Pot Khmer Rouge forces to deliver some of their Chinese-supplied weaponry to the Laotian guerrillas. The so-called Khmer Rouge Radio, actually in China, has now begun broadcasting in Laotian. China appears to be active along Laos' northern border as well. And, the article notes, China's agreement to help resettle, under United Nations auspices, some Laotian refugees from camps in Thailand is widely seen as a pretext for arming the refugees and sending them into Laos as "resistance fighters." Indeed, the U.N. had asked China to assure them that the refugees would be resettled on Hainan Island, but, after they were accepted, China announced that Hainan was "unsuitable" and the refugees were being resettled in Yunnan Province, on the Laotian border. —

MOSSAD Training in U.S.?

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The advertisement which is reprinted here appeared in 1979 in numerous Israeli newspapers, every week, for many months. It reads as follows:

REQUIRED: STUDENTS TO WORK IN THE USA Necessary qualifications:

- Completion of military service in a combat unit (command position).
- Good health, profile 82 at least.
- Must be studying in the United States and/or planning to go therein Summer 1979 or beginning of 1980. Candidates must have been accepted at an educational institution in the U.S.
- Candidate must pay travel expenses.
- Those interested should write and enclose a personal biography, personal information, identity card number. In Israel: P.O. Box 39351, Tel Aviv (Attn: M.M.) In U.S.A.: General Consulate/Israel in New York 800 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10017, —Only Qualified Persons Will Be Answered—

A reliable source has informed *Covert Action Information Bulletin* that this advertisement and similar ones are for MOSSAD operatives to come to the U.S. for intelligence collection/operations. The requirement of military service in a combat unit is informative. —



HUDSON INSTITUTE TARGETS SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL SUPPORTS "REFORM" IN EL SALVADOR

The document reproduced herein was recently received by *CovertAction Information Bulletin*. The Hudson Institute is well-connected to the defense and intelligence apparatus. Staffed by some 44 professionals, a number of whom have worked at the Pentagon or CIA, the Institute is endowed by more than forty major multinational corporations, such as Exxon, Castle & Cooke, Bank of America, Union Carbide, American Telephone & Telegraph, Mitsui, and the Royal Bank of Canada. It performs wide-ranging classified research on both national and international issues to fulfill some of the voracious need of the energy and national security network.

The document indicates that the Hudson Institute, directed by Herman Kahn, the man who thinks that nuclear war is "thinkable," is involved in a desperate attempt to convince socialists around the world that they should not support the Salvadorean "extreme left," and should support the so-called reforms of the ruling junta.

A group of self-styled "experts" are being assembled to target the social democrat parties in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, France and Portugal. The experts include people with ties to AIFLD—the American Institute for Free Labor Development, a subsidiary of the AFL-CIO with long-documented ties to the CIA.

Supporters of the Salvadorean resistance to the junta have exposed the so-called "agrarian reform program" for what it really is, "pacification" along the lines of Operation Phoenix and other programs in Vietnam, whose primary purpose was the elimination of political opposition, whether by assassination, "strategic hamlets" or otherwise. Indeed, in Vietnam, land reform was a major instrument in the program to isolate and destroy the NLF infrastructure.

Operation Phoenix used as cover for its CIA managers the CORDS program (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), with overall direction by William Colby. He admitted to Congress in 1971: "Land reform is part of pacification." Ominously, one of the "experts" listed in the Hudson Institute memo is Roy Prosterman, who, according to a recent InterPress Service release, "claimed major responsibility in the CORDS program." Prosterman is at present advising the Salvadorean junta on land reform, just as he did in Vietnam. AIFLD has admitted that, although there is no formal contract with Prosterman, they are paying for much of his expenses, and he is "cooperating with us."

Prosterman also is said to have written the land reform law for the Philippines under the Marcos martial law government. That program, InterPress notes, is "notable for its almost complete failure to improve the lives of Filipino peasants." The Philippine example, which exempted the

lands of the major agricultural multinationals from any restraints, appears to have provided a model for the Salvadorean program, which also exempts the lands of the major coffee corporations. For these and other reasons related to the severe repression in the Philippines, and to the declared anti-communist views of Raul Manglapus—viewed by some observers as central to a U.S.-backed alternative government to Marcos—his involvement with the Hudson Institute takes on added significance.



1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 800, Arlington, Virginia 22209 • (703) 272-1750

October 14, 1980

Note for:

Ambassador Fowler
Mr. James Clark
Mr. John Blunden

Re: Specific suggestions for informing European social democrats about the agrarian reforms and political progress in El Salvador

On October 3, 1980, I sent you a short note concerning the need for a more active and time-urgent effort to achieve changes in the Socialist International position on the extreme left in El Salvador and Central America. I still hope we can discuss this at greater length in the near future.

Among the things which need to be done are to send credible, well informed individuals to Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom (the Labor party and the SI secretariat), France, and Portugal, who can meet with democratic socialist leaders and party staff concerned with international affairs. I urge that State and ICA consider sending one or more of the following:

- Mr. Michael Hammer, AIFLD, four years experience in El Salvador, has played a major role in the agrarian reform this year and speaks fluent Spanish and good German.
- Ms. Mary Temple, Independent experts with the Land Council, actively involved in other successful agrarian reforms and in the efforts in El Salvador this year; however, I believe they speak only English (this should be checked.)
- Mr. Roy Prosterman, Head of the Social Christian Movement of the Philippines, a Christian Democratic group currently in Washington, D.C. exile while opposing a rightist authoritarian government and the communist groups; close friend of Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador; articulate in English and Spanish and well informed about the political situation in El Salvador. He will, in any case, be attending a Christian Democratic conference on human rights in Madrid, November 3-7 and could then meet with members of the UDC and PSOE in Spain to discuss El Salvador. (his telephone is: 638-0400).

Cordially *[Signature]*
Constantine C. Menges

CCM/sq HEADQUARTERS: QUAKER BUNGE ROAD, CLOTHES LINE HILL, NEW YORK, NY 10036
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These and other clandestine efforts to stem the tide of popular revolution in El Salvador are undoubtedly doomed to failure, given the massive support by the people for the progressive forces. However, it is a sad fact that forces such as the Hudson Institute will, through their efforts to interfere, only increase the amount of bloodshed which will occur before the victory of the Salvadorean people. Those efforts will be no more successful than they were in Vietnam.

The CIA Commemorative

by Ken Lawrence

The United States Postal Service released a stamp commemorating the Central Intelligence Agency in early September. This posed a unique problem for USPS, since the CIA prefers to avoid public attention as much as possible, but ultimately the decision was to go ahead with the stamp using one of the CIA's most effective covers, that of organized labor.

Despite the stamp's slogan, "Organized Labor Proud and Free," knowledgeable observers, even those without access to classified information, exposed the ruse within a day. One clue, they said, was that instead of featuring a prominent symbol of the labor movement, such as Lane Kirkland, Jay Lovestone, or Irving Brown, the commemorative carries an ugly sneering face of an eagle, with a sinister curl in its hooked beak—an obvious CIA emblem.

Shortly after this joint USPS-CIA operation was disclosed, Rep. Edward P. Boland (D.-Mass.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, introduced a bill to outlaw revelations of collaboration between the post office and the intelligence agencies. "Unless Congress passes this bill, it will be impossible to prevent Louis Wolf from exposing a planned air mail stamp honoring retired Gen. George J. Keegan, Jr. for his discovery of the new Russian particle-beam weapons. We have to be able to preserve the integrity of the Soviet Threat commemorative."

Jerry J. Berman, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, strongly disagreed. "We think it may be constitutionally permissible for Congress to protect the secrecy of the CIA's mail surveillance operations," Berman said, "but this bill goes too far. If Boland's bill had been law back in 1964 when David Wise and Thomas B. Ross wrote *The Invisible Government*, they might have gone to jail for writing about the CIA's operation in support of President Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines. After all, a commemorative stamp honoring Magsaysay was issued in 1957 as part of the 'champions of Liberty' series, and no one had previously exposed it as a CIA stamp. The language of this bill is too vague to pass the test of constitutionality."

→ CIA spokesman Herbert Hetu supported the Boland bill. "A lot of times they hurt innocent people with allegations like this. What if *Covert Action Information Bulletin* had written, back in 1954, that the Columbia University commemorative was a CIA stamp? Assassins would have been out the next day trying to kill the head of the Institute of War and Peace Studies on the false assumption that he's one of ours. Those traitors are so low they'd probably even go after the 1963 Food for Peace stamp." Hetu would neither confirm nor deny that the new commemorative is a

Ken Lawrence is a well-known American philatelist, who occasionally pretends to be a magazine columnist.

CIA issue. "That gets into our sources and methods of intelligence," he said.

Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), who had originally offered qualified support for the Boland bill, appeared to be backing off somewhat. "Those guys could have avoided this whole flap," he said. "All they had to do was put the Shah of Iran on the stamp. No one would have paid any attention to what Wolf and his gang might have said about that."

The most sensational development in the controversy came when Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) charged that the leak originated in the White House. "It came from Zbigniew Brzezinski's staff," Aspin told the near-empty House chamber. "He's been sniping at detente all along. He figured once the Russians got wind of this they'd never agree to another joint US-USSR commemorative issue like the Apollo/Soyuz stamps of 1975, even if the State Department offered one as a gesture to reopen the SALT talks. Brzezinski had expected the withdrawal of the Summer Olympics commemoratives to make the point, but not a single KGB forgery turned up in Afghanistan, so now he resorted to this."



Secretary of State Edmund Muskie denied any knowledge of the stamp's origin, but he agreed that the disclosure could not have come at a worse time. Labor Secretary Ray Marshall, meanwhile, charged that a KGB "mole" in the post office was responsible for the leak. "The purpose

of this thing is to discredit our unions' solidarity with the Polish strikers," he said. "They're trying to dredge up that old story about how the CIA used our labor people to break a dockers' strike in France. But that's ancient history; they won't get away with it."

A spokesman for the Reagan campaign claimed the whole affair was "political from start to finish. Carter knows that with Bush on the ticket we've got the CIA vote locked up. Putting out a CIA stamp now is a desperate attempt to undercut our support at the Agency, but the career men know they can count on Ron for a lot more stamps than they ever got from this administration."

An editorial in the *Christian Science Monitor* criticized the post office for issuing the stamp "at this time." Even though the post office is now largely run as a private corporation, said the *Monitor*, "the suspicion will persist that Mr. Carter's influence may have been involved. Coming so soon after the President's questionable dealings with his brother, it can only harm his stature in the capitals of our European allies. Mrs. Thatcher has already felt added pressure from the Labour Party back-benchers who oppose her plan for closer U.S.-British postal cooperation. They warn that if the U.S. gets advance information on British stamp programs, it may leak to the Provisional IRA. Mr. Carter should move quickly to allay these fears by ordering that the stamp be reissued with a 'u' added to Labor."

CIA Assassinations

(Continued from page 28)

and BOSS provided information about Communist activities in Africa." Several victims of the CIA-supplied hit team are known: "Former Chilean Gen. Carlos Prats and his wife, Cora, killed in an October 1974 bombing in Buenos Aires; Chilean Minister of Defense Oscar Bonillo, blown up with five other people in a helicopter in Chile in March 1975; Ronni Karpen Moffitt and Orlando Letelier, who died in the September 1976 Washington car bombing; and South African economist Robert Smit and his wife, who were shot to death November 1977 in their South African home.

"Another couple, Chilean exile leader Bernardo Leighton and his wife Ana, were seriously injured in an unsuccessful attempt in Rome in October 1975." When Trento contacted the CIA for a response to these allegations, spokesman Dale Peterson told him, "Sources and methods are something we just can't talk about, and that's what you are getting into."

One of the protected witnesses in the Letelier assassination case, Ricardo Canete, who testified under the name Carlos Casado, had worked for the CIA. He says the CIA financed the escape of Virgilio Pablo Romero and Jose Dionisio Suarez Esquivel, wanted for the assassination of Letelier and Moffitt, with counterfeit money and South African gold Krugerrands. FBI sources told Trento that the CIA may have encouraged anti-Castro Cuban exiles to

There actually is a mystery concerning the timing of the stamp; no one has yet disclosed precisely what event is being commemorated, and there are a number of obvious possibilities. It seems unlikely that the CIA's creation would be celebrated 33 years later, but it has been exactly 30 years since the agency gained exclusive jurisdiction over covert operations abroad. The U-2 spy flights over the Soviet Union began 25 years ago, and Francis Gary Powers was shot down during one of them 20 years ago. The CIA's counter-terror program in Vietnam began 15 years ago, and its expanded role in Indochina contributed to the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia 10 years ago. Five years ago the agency ran its secret war in Angola.

These are only a few of the CIA's well-known achievements; there are many others. Perhaps we are honoring the twentieth anniversary of the first assassination plot against Fidel Castro, or the fifteenth anniversary of the CIA's bestseller, *The Penkovsky Papers*, or the tenth anniversary of the Agency's initial plot against Salvador Allende in Chile.

But who knows? Maybe it will turn out that the eagle really is supposed to look like Lane Kirkland after all. Postmaster General William F. Bolger has been unavailable for comment.

attack various Soviet and Eastern European legations in New York.

What would have happened had a major newspaper published a sentence like this only a few years ago: "DINA systematically killed 17 operatives of the Cuban Intelligence Service at CIA request between 1974 and 1976 throughout Latin America, according to sources at the highest level of the CIA." It would have generated a large-scale public outcry, followed by an inevitable train of investigations, public hearings, critical reports, and urgent demands for reform.

Yet, thinking about it even more carefully, these CIA-sponsored assassinations were being carried out during the precise period when the Agency's activities were being investigated by the Rockefeller Commission, the Pike Committee, and the Church Committee, and aggressive journalists often were ferreting out things those investigators were reluctant to report. Obviously the CIA's killers were not deterred even when domestic opposition to their activities reached its highest point. That fact alone ought to be compelling evidence that the CIA cannot be reformed.

But today the situation has worsened considerably. Even minimal, ineffective reforms are not on the political agenda. Instead we are being subjected to the insanity of "unleashing" the CIA. Apparently the ability to murder a mere 17 Cubans in three years isn't enough, so we now have to lift the "restraints." Where will it end?

NAMING NAMES

In this issue, we uncover four Chiefs of Station or Chiefs of Base, and four Deputy Chiefs of Station.

India

The new Chief of Base at the Bombay, **India** Consulate General is **Stephen W. Richter**, born December 7, 1941 in Washington, D.C. Records indicate that Richter was an "administrative officer" with the Department of the Army from 1968 to 1973, apparently military cover for his CIA work. In 1973 he began diplomatic cover, as an economic-commercial officer at the Islamabad, Pakistan Embassy. In early 1977 he was posted to the Tehran, Iran Embassy, as Second Secretary, evidently leaving Iran before the take-over of the Embassy. According to the April 1980 Bombay Consular List, he has been posted there, as consul.

Indonesia

In *Bulletin* Number 8 we noted the Chief of Station at the Jakarta, **Indonesia** Embassy, and three of the case officers stationed there. We have now discovered the Deputy Chief of Station, working under Carl Edward Gebhardt. He is **John J. LeClair**, born July 24, 1933 in New York. LeClair was posted under military cover from 1957 to 1967, described in the *Biographic Register* as an "analyst" for the U.S. Army. In 1967 he entered under diplomatic cover as an AID "community analyst" in Vientiane, Laos. He served in various AID capacities in Laos until at least 1971. From that time until 1978 there are no entries regarding him in State Department records. According to the March 1979 Jakarta Diplomatic and Consular List, he arrived there in June 1978, as an attache.

Jordan

In *CAIB* Number 2 we noted the presence at the Amman, **Jordan** Embassy of case officer **Ralph C. Hughes**, who was posted there in June 1978. According to the January 1980 Amman Diplomatic List, Hughes was still there, and we believe that he is, at this time, Deputy Chief of Station.

Korea

In our last issue we exposed the Chief of Station at the Seoul, **Republic of Korea** Embassy, CIA veteran Robert George Brewster. We have now ascertained that his Deputy Chief of Station is **Bruce L. Ruben**, born December 7, 1926, in New York. Ruben first appears in government records as an "economic analyst" for the Department of

Commerce, from 1953 to 1955, and moved in that year to diplomatic cover as an economic officer at the Tehran, Iran Embassy. He returned to Headquarters in 1958, and there are no State Department record references to him from that time until 1979—a 21-year gap during which time he must have been under deep cover. According to the June 1980 Seoul Diplomatic and Consular List, he arrived there in August 1979, as attache, and, in fact, as Deputy Chief of Station under Brewster. (Brewster was posted to South Korea in June 1978, and may have been transferred by now.) [See articles in this issue on South Korea.]

Nepal

The Chief of Station at the Kathmandu, **Nepal** Embassy is **James E. Burkart**, born September 29, 1932 in Wisconsin. State Department records indicate that Burkart engaged in private experience with an educational foundation overseas from 1960 to 1967, most likely Agency deep cover. In 1967 he appeared as a projects officer with AID, until 1971, when he was posted under diplomatic cover to the Istanbul, Turkey Consulate General, as an economic-commercial officer. He was apparently Chief of Base there, given his experience. His whereabouts from 1977 to 1979 is not known, but in June of 1979 he was assigned to Nepal, as Second Secretary.

Pakistan

Paul L. Thibault is the Chief of Base at the Karachi, **Pakistan** Consulate General, posted there in July 1979 as consul. Thibault served from 1970 to 1972 at the Calcutta Consulate General, as a political officer, before returning to Headquarters. We have been unable to ascertain his postings from 1972 to 1975, in which year he received further training at the Foreign Service Institute. Records are barren again from 1976 to 1979, when, as noted above, he was posted to Karachi.

Panama

The Chief of Station in the sensitive post at the Panama City, **Panama** Embassy is **Brian H. Bramson**, born December 18, 1940 in Bolivia. Records show that Bramson served in the U.S. Army from 1962 to 1964, at which time he commenced three years as a Department of the Army civilian employee, actually his Agency cover. In April 1967 he was posted to the Paris, France Embassy, as a political officer and, shortly thereafter, as an economic-commercial officer. In 1970 he was posted to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and in 1973 he was at the Foreign Service Institute for language

training. From September 1973 to November 1974 he was at the Rio de Janeiro Consulate General, followed by three years at the Brasilia Embassy. There are no records of his whereabouts from 1977 to 1979, but, CAIB has been informed by a journalist recently returned from Panama, he was stationed at the Embassy there at least as of September 1979. Considering his experience, it seems likely that he is Chief of Station.

United Kingdom

One of the most desired CIA postings in the world, because of the prestige factor, the relative ease of living, and the absence of a language barrier is the London Station. In short, it is not a "hardship post." In CAIB Number 8, the Chief of Station Richard F. Stoltz, Jr. was listed. His Deputy, who like Stoltz also arrived in late 1979 and also appears on the London Diplomatic List as Political Attaché, replacing William Morrow McGhee is **Katharine C. Hart**.

She is an interesting figure. Having worked her way up through the Directorate of Plans, the covert side of the CIA, she became a senior supervisor during the mid-1970s in the Requirements Division, a pivotal body which fields requests from Agency posts overseas for clandestine operations funding.

Her husband, John Limond Hart, joined the CIA in 1948, and served as Special Assistant to the Ambassador and Chief of Station in Bangkok, Thailand from 1955-58, and as Chief of Station in Rabat, Morocco between 1960-64. He was one of the central figures who came out of "retirement" at the CIA's request to investigate the circumstances of the Agency's 3½ year detention of Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, who according to Hart's testimony before the House Assassination Committee, was subjected to "hostile interrogation." The interrogations alone spanned 292 days; Nosenko was kept in total isolation at a Washington-area safehouse with a 60-watt bulb kept on around the clock, allowed nothing to read, and forbidden to speak with the 24-hour guards. This treatment drove him to hallucinations and acute alcoholism. Originally, when he first defected in 1964, Nosenko told the CIA he had knowledge about Lee Harvey Oswald, but some high officials at Langley believed he was attempting to infiltrate the Agency. He was subsequently exonerated of all suspicion, was supplied a different identity, and has gone on-board at \$35,000 per annum as a counselor to the CIA and FBI on Soviet intelligence.

It is particularly noteworthy that the surprise Hart testimony on September 15, 1978, happened just nine days before John Arthur Paisley, who was also involved in the Nosenko interrogations, disappeared. Paisley was alleged to have shot himself in the back of the head, tied heavy weights around his waist, and jumped off his sailboat into the Chesapeake Bay. Paisley's wife, Maryann, also worked at the CIA in the Requirements Division under none other than: Katharine C. Hart.

U.S.-CHINA INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION

Ronald Reagan's recent statements about upgrading the status of U.S. relations with Taiwan may not only endanger relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) but also jeopardize a top-secret intelligence-gathering operation.

A staff member of the National Security Council, which is directed by President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, states that "U.S. security could be gravely damaged by the loss of intelligence information on the Soviet Union from secret 'accommodation' sites in the PRC."

Under the terms of an unofficial secret agreement, the Department of Defense, following a request over two years ago from counterparts in the PRC, provided sophisticated electronic communications equipment, such as wideband signal receivers, to intercept and record radio and microwave transmissions from within the Soviet Union and from Soviet satellites in space. The agreement, which was negotiated without informing the U.S. State Department or the U.S. Ambassador to China, also places personnel from the National Security Agency--the most secretive and sophisticated of the U.S. intelligence agencies--inside China. NSA technical advisors have been training Chinese technicians to operate and service the electronic equipment.

The NSA was the one agency that President Carter refused to discuss when he unveiled his famous executive order reorganizing the intelligence community on January 24, 1978. However, Carter did acknowledge that some intelligence operations, such as satellite reconnaissance and electronic communications interception, are so sensitive they could not be made public.

In exchange for the equipment and technical advisors, China agreed to share all the intelligence material with the United States. During the past year, "the traffic" from the accommodation sites established along the Sino-Soviet border has become increasingly valuable, especially after the loss of NSA monitoring sites in Iran.

Now high-ranking Chinese military officials are hinting that the project will be terminated if new overtures are made to Taiwan. National Security Council officials interpret the warning as a signal to Ronald Reagan, since they assert that loss of the "traffic" from the sites could seriously jeopardize U.S. security. The warning also seems directed at high-ranking U.S. military officials and members of Congress who have been calling for increased arms sales to Taiwan.

Big Brother 1980:

THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY:

The Biggest Eavesdropper of Them All

A CAIB Interview


Introduction By Stewart Klepper

Imagine this. It is 1984, and the government announces that henceforth, because of foreign threats and growing terrorism, no sealed mail will be delivered. All mail will be screened by computer, based primarily on the address and return address, and any mail to or from potential security risks will be read and copied. Shocking? Yet this situation already exists for almost all telegrams and phone calls coming into or going out of the U.S. The main difference is that this policy has never been announced; it was, for many years, one of the better kept secrets of our intelligence community.

Until 1976, the government consistently denied that it was intercepting the private communications of American citizens. Then, in the aftermath of Watergate, Congressional investigations revealed the tip of the iceberg. In hearings before a Senate Select Committee chaired by Frank Church, the director of the National Security Agency, then Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, admitted that NSA had been reading Americans' telegrams and listening to their phone calls. This was known as Operation Shamrock. Information was collected by the NSA on Americans involved in drug trafficking, potential terrorist activities, and "possible foreign support or influence on civil disturbances," i.e. the civil rights and anti-war movements. One of the principle activities of the NSA, in fact, was to search for evidence of foreign involvement in the anti-war movement, thus bootstrapping itself into the domestic surveillance business. No such evidence was found.

NSA is hardly a household acronym, even today. Few know that its headquarters are at Fort Meade in Maryland. It is a standing joke at Fort Meade that NSA stands for "Never Say Anything." But the implications of the NSA's activity are anything but funny.

Established in 1952 by President Truman, in an executive order which has remained secret to this day, the prime mission of the NSA was supposed to be the protection of U.S. communications from foreign interception and the cracking of foreign codes. But from its inception, the NSA has been deeply involved in the interception of any communications thought by it to be of national security interest.



The NSA is a big operation. Its Fort Meade headquarters are said to be bigger than the CIA's building in Langley, Virginia, and more modern than the Pentagon. Its annual budget is estimated at between \$1.5 billion and \$15 billion. It has the most powerful computers in the world. Former *New York Times* foreign correspondent Harrison Salisbury has reported that the agency destroys 20 tons of paper a day, using the waste paper to heat its buildings. But it is the information that the NSA keeps which is truly frightening. It is not difficult to determine

that the NSA monitors all, or nearly all, telephone calls and telegrams coming into and going out of the United States. Beyond this, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the NSA monitors much domestic telephone traffic. It has the capability to do this, as General Allen admitted before the Church committee.

General Allen testified, in carefully chosen words, that on the day of the hearing, Oct. 29, 1975, the NSA was not monitoring purely domestic communications. He did not state that the NSA would not do so in the future. To give the reader a flavor of this testimony, the following is an exchange between Senator Mondale and Gen. Allen:

Mondale: As I understand your testimony, you limit yourself to interception of communications between—either to or from—a foreign terminal and one in the U.S. You do not intercept messages to and from persons within the U.S.

Allen: That is correct, sir.

Mondale: But I also understand that it is a matter of policy and not law . . . There is not, in your judgment, or in the judgment of the Agency, a restriction that would limit you precisely to those policy guidelines that you now have.

Allen: Well, I believe that is correct, sir . . .

Considering Gen. Allen's position, that giving any testimony at all about the NSA might be a violation of the secrecy laws, even this limited denial cannot be taken at face value.

If the NSA is not intercepting domestic calls, it has wasted a lot of effort developing the capability. As one

example of this capability, we have learned of the existence of a secret facility in Suitland, Maryland, operated by the NSA, which is located within a few hundred yards of a main AT&T microwave relay station which handles many thousands of domestic calls a day. From this secret facility, tens of thousands of one-way communication circuits run to Fort Meade. There is no question that the NSA has all the equipment in place to listen in on domestic long distance calls to and from Washington.

In 1977 General Allen was replaced as head of the NSA by Admiral Bobby Inman, a veteran intelligence man who received the Distinguished Service Medal for his "articulate" testimony before Congress. One of the Admiral's stated goals is to bring all research and development of coding systems in this country under the NSA's control. This program will not prevent foreign powers from developing unbreakable codes—they already have them—but it will retard American citizens from being able to defeat the NSA's communications dragnet.

In fact, it is the existence today of genuinely unbreakable codes which calls into question the very reason for the NSA to exist. The days of breaking the Japanese naval code are over. All major powers have the knowledge and the hardware, using mathematical formulas and random or "pseudo-random" strings, to send information digitally which cannot be understood by anyone without the formula. The NSA will not be able to perpetuate for much longer the myth that it can break any code.

The interview which follows was conducted with two experts on communications intelligence, one an NSA veteran. For obvious reasons, they cannot be identified here.

Q. You are experts in the interception of broad-band electronic communication. Could you explain briefly what this is?

A. The ordinary citizen regards wiretapping as a person operating a tape recorder, where the person makes a direct connection into the private line of the individual citizen. Decades ago this was the predominant technique used by intelligence and law enforcement people. It is still employed in some large measure.

Today, however, the bulk of interception and acquisition of information sent by citizens is being done by the intelligence community at select points in the long lines telecommunication system in this country and around the world. These are at places where there is a great concentration of circuits. We call them pinch points, or points of constriction.

Q. What kind of interception takes place at these points?

A. There are two kinds of interception operations. One would be a cooperative interception operation, where the communications common carrier, such as AT&T in the U.S., is cooperating with the intelligence operation. The

other is the covert operation, where the communications common carrier is *not* cooperating with the intercepting agency. Many covert operations involve interception of microwave multi-channel telecommunications circuits by a hidden antenna—in fact two antennas, one aimed at each link of microwave towers.

Microwave interception can be on terrestrial microwave circuits as well as microwave circuits passing from a satellite to an earth station. The technologies are essentially the same in both cases. Also, it is possible to intercept multiple communications circuits that are passing over a wire or coaxial cable, wherein microwaves are not involved. Sophisticated pickup loops are used in proximity to the cable to intercept bundles of communications as they pass over it.

Q. The governments of the world can't listen to every word being transmitted. How do they narrow down what they analyze?

A. The intelligence agencies involved in communications intelligence (COMINT) use extremely sophisticated equipment to separate out targeted communications, and then

subject these communications to further analysis. It is as if the communications pass through a series of sieves, each having a finer mesh.

This is the hierarchy in the process of broad-band telecommunications interception. It includes interception of non-oral communications such as telex, TWX, and other telegraphic communications, as well as oral communications. Also, a portion of the *oral* communication is *non-oral*. This is the header, the dialing information. So with classic non-oral communications *and* oral communications there are associated non-oral bits of information.

In this hierarchy, the first and second levels of screening are done on a non-oral basis, on the header information, the address on the envelope, so to speak. Typically, this is the beedle-de-beeps one hears after dialing a long distance call. This information is used by NSA computers to screen phone calls and telex communications. The process is done on-line and in real time, and a computer decides immediately whether or not to drop a tape recorder into the circuit. In the first instance of screening, a recording is not made of *all* the communications that are intercepted.

Our Department of Defense and Department of Justice have been extremely careful in orchestrating the legal definition of "interception" to *exclude* the acquisition of information of a non-oral nature.

Q. You are referring to the court decision allowing the use of a pen register without a warrant?

A. Yes. Almost from the beginning of the use of dial telephones, the government employed a simple device called a pen register, which would record the numbers being called from a telephone. Today the device called a pen register is a sophisticated little box which may be secreted in a telephone exchange or on the local wire of a single subscriber. The modern device involves tape recorders, printers and summary equipment which will identify not only the called number, but also the time and length of the call. It will identify numbers which are misdialed, and even record the time that a person picks up the receiver and places it back on the hook.



The number of misdialed calls will indicate the state of mind of the person. Over a period of time it might indicate a general atrophy of the person's ability to memorize a number. It might indicate a state of inebriation, or a pattern of mental aberration.

The primary intelligence utility of the pen register and its more sophisticated cousins, however, is its ability to develop a behavior profile of the individual; whom he or she associates with and how often, and by inference what kind of person he or she is. Additionally, it tells if the citizen is talking to another person targeted for surveillance.

The Department of Justice defends with unusual vigor the right to use this device. And resting quietly behind the legal protections for the use of the pen register is an extremely large matrix of even more sophisticated equipment which will maintain surveillance on broad-band telecommunication trunks.

Now, it may be argued that there is no actual acquisition of the communications which have been analyzed by computer and rejected as having no intelligence interest, since no permanent recording was ever made. The intelligence community insulates itself by saying, "No recording of this information was ever made."

Q. You are saying that they will explain away the instances where no recording was made. That ignores the point that in some instances a recording is made, and the message is analyzed.

A. Yes.

It would be wrong to state that *every* telephone in this country is tapped. There is, however, reason to believe that a large percentage of domestic long distance telephone calls are being analyzed by non-oral means to retrieve messages of interest to the intelligence community.

You must understand that the activity of the NSA and other associated agencies is not limited to interception of communications where one or both terminals are in a foreign country. Interception is done both in the United States and outside the United States. Interception is done where both terminals are in the U.S., where one terminal is in the U.S. and one outside the U.S., and where both parties are outside the U.S. A great deal of the communications that are being scanned are domestic telecommunications. A greater intensity of surveillance, however, is directed toward communications outside the U.S., or communications where one terminal is outside the U.S.

Of that which is sifted out and recorded, there are other levels of analysis, either digital, or by having a person actually listen to the recording or read the telegram or telex.

Q. You are saying that all traffic, where one or both parties are outside the U.S., is being intercepted?

A. You are using the word "intercepted." The NSA chooses not to use the word "interception" when a computer analysis of the dialing information is done, but no recording is made. In the Wiretap Act of 1968, the word "interception" is used over a hundred times. Its companion act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, does not use the word "interception" once. If they used the word "intercep-

tion" they would have to define it. "Interception" is defined in the Wiretap Act and includes the temporary acquisition and analysis of information.

Now, the question is, are all international phone calls and telexes being intercepted? Under the definition in the Wiretap Act of 1968, virtually all. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, what is done is not defined as interception in most cases. But from the digital standpoint, the address information, virtually all international calls are analyzed.

This is extremely frightening in terms of the freedom of the people of the world. The NSA and the National Security Council do not want the American people to become aware of the great amount of analysis that is being done. If the people were aware of this, they could take measures to seal their communications cryptographically. There would be a great expansion of the cryptographic industry, so that people could send their telex messages in a very secure manner. You see, for the first time in history, the code makers have outstripped the code breakers, and relatively inexpensive methods can be used to code telex messages. These coding methods cannot be broken by the NSA. The NSA does not want Congress, or the public, to understand this.


Q. Are more calls recorded than listened to by human analysts?

A. Perhaps so, but I would say that of those conversations that are recorded, a greater portion are listened to. In the case of non-oral communications, even more sophisticated automatic analysis is done before the human looks at it. In the case of a telegram, it would be projected on a cathode ray screen, and the analyst would quickly scan it to determine if it is of intelligence interest.

Q. Suppose a person that the NSA is interested in uses a pay phone?

A. The telephone company's telecommunications system computer is available to the NSA. That computer knows all the pay phones in the country. If a call is made between two pay phones, the assumption is made that nefarious activity is more likely to be going on. If a call is made from one pay phone to a home or office phone, the presumption is less likely, because at least the party who owns the one unit is known.

Now, suppose you are a person involved in political activity not to the liking of the NSA. They can develop a profile of your dialing habits—whom you talk to. As a



NSA Headquarters at Ft. Meade

Q. Is there a pre-determined formula to decide what will be recorded and read or listened to, or is this left in some degree to the judgment of the individual agent?

A. Both cases. There are lists of key words; hundreds and thousands of them. Quite often a phone number, or a combination of phone numbers is targeted, so that if A's phone calls B's phone, a recording is made of that conversation. Or, all calls from A's phone may be targeted; or all calls to A's phone, or both.

But, as sophisticated as the computer is, and as comprehensive as the guidelines may be, there is no substitute for the skill of the intelligence analyst.

result, if you have spoken to a person several times, they will know this and his telephone will be included in the octopus surrounding you, and they may have surveillance on your friend's phone because of his association with you.

Q. Regarding calls from one pay phone to another, most of these calls would have no foreign intelligence value, I assume?

A. That's correct, but you must understand that the term "foreign intelligence" is an elastic one, and can mean what the NSA wishes. It can mean political information, economic information, drug enforcement information, or even fish and wildlife information.

Q. If an agency has a tap on a phone, can they tell where an incoming call is dialed from?

A. Yes. An ordinary tap will not do this, but there are systems that will.

Q. How quickly?

A. Immediately. You should understand that with the TSPS system, where you dial 0 and then the long distance number, the operator has in front of him or her on an illuminated screen, both the number you are calling from and the number you are calling.

Also, there is the 911 system. With this system the police station or fire station knows immediately what phone called, and its location. The intelligence community has latched on to this facility and used it beyond its original intent. I say beyond its original intent, but the intelligence community and the NSA participated in the development of the TSPS and 911 systems.

Q. Suppose a conversation is recorded which has no foreign intelligence interest. Will it be erased?

A. Yes, in some cases. Unfortunately, the propensity of the intelligence community is not to erase anything. They can store tremendous amounts of information in a very small space. The NSA uses microfiche, for instance, to store conversations, and millions of bits of information can be stored on one square inch.

Methods of retrieval are rather sophisticated also. Often legal cases have arisen under the Freedom of Information

Act where the plaintiff has requested information, telephone calls, etc., from the NSA. The NSA will throw up a smokescreen and say, "we have the information, or we may have it, but it is virtually impossible for us to find it." In fact they often have the information, and the retrieval process is there if they want to use it. It is expensive, but when they are looking for intelligence targets they will do it. They just don't consider FOIA suits important enough to retrieve the information.

Q. Is there a computer technology to screen conversations on the basis of key words?

A. Yes, they can do voice key word analysis. However, this technique is not in widespread use on oral communications, because there are other processes that will allow them to zero in on conversations of interest. They can do it, but it requires a great deal of expense and computer time. This is because your pronunciation of the word "oil" will be different from mine, and my pronunciation will vary. O-I-L will be spelled the same way virtually all the time when transmitted over telex. But there is variation in the inflection of the voice, and it is generally not cost-effective to screen oral communications by automatic electronic analysis.

Now, I must say again that these techniques have been developed and are being used, but not on as broad a scale as is popularly thought, on oral communications.

Q. Is there a capability to analyze communications in foreign languages?


A. Absolutely. Any and all languages. There is hardly a language that travels over the telex networks which is not covered, although some languages are targeted more heavily than others, the languages of socialist countries, for instance. Computers are not generally used to analyze oral communications, though, in English or other languages. There is work afoot in this area, but it is not nearly as cost effective as other means of screening and sifting down that conversation for a human intelligence analyst. But in the case of non-oral communications, the computers are rigged with the analysis capacity of all the primary languages on earth.

Also, the computers are programmed to detect gibberish words, or words without vowels, or words where the letters fall outside the proportions one would expect. For instance, more m's than e's. This would indicate an effort to encrypt information, and the message would automatically be dropped out for analysis. Secretly, the NSA has taken the position that if you encrypt your message, you are likely doing something wrong. It's as if the post office said, "if you seal your envelope, you are doing something against the interest of your country."

With the slightest scintilla of a doubt, a communication is dropped out for further analysis. This criterion of a scintilla of a doubt is, without a doubt, a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Q. Are technical changes making interception easier at the local level?

A. Regarding the ESS telephone exchange, yes. The ESS, Electronic Switching System, is basically a completely



Typical Microwave Facility

programmable digital computer. Because it is extremely flexible, the ESS exchanges are being programmed to provide the pen register function. It can be programmed to analyze the dialing habits of many persons in an exchange, with no additional hardware. The NSA can move the software into a local exchange without the local technicians knowing it has been done. And, the capability can be removed almost instantaneously if anyone should become inquisitive.

- All that is needed to do this is a quiet, cooperative arrangement between the NSA and the upper level of the telephone company. And remember that historically the relationship between the communications carriers and the intelligence agencies has been extremely cooperative. Witness the hearings of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, the Bella Abzug subcommittee, in 1977-78, which brought the international wire carriers before Congress to explain their relationship with the FBI and NSA; a relationship which spanned over 30 years and included Operation Shamrock, where 75,000 dossiers were accumulated on U.S. citizens. The NSA and FBI obtained the cooperation of the international wire carriers, ITT, RCA Global Communications, and others, on the basis of patriotism: "Please allow us to photograph your telexes, please allow us to install a device that will scan your communications."



Tenley Tower Telegraph Facility

Apparently, the carriers bent over backwards to accommodate the agencies without referring the matters to their own legal departments to determine if the services they were providing the intelligence community were really law-

ful. There is reason to believe that there are continuing *quid pro quo* arrangements between the communications carriers and the FBI and NSA today.

Witness the great force with which the Department of Justice and the NSA have moved into recent Supreme Court cases on the use of the pen register. It seems that both the defense and prosecution were working in concert to insure that non-oral interception, scanning, would be permitted outside the requirements of the 1968 Wiretap Act.

No charters for our intelligence community have proceeded forward except for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which has to do with scanning by the NSA. Why was a tremendous effort brought to bear on Congress by the intelligence community? Because they realized this was an area of great legal jeopardy to them. The Act doesn't inhibit them. It's a misnomer to call them charters. I call them licenses.

Q. Beyond these cooperative arrangements, how does the intelligence community manipulate the communications carriers?

A. On the corporate level, manipulation occurs when the intelligence community comes in using their own jargon, which corporate heads and company technologists don't understand. What the corporate people think they are agreeing to and what the intelligence community knows they have conned the company into doing are two entirely different things. A lot of secret language is being thrown around.


Also, the intelligence agencies are not above doing manipulation and intimidation of lower level people. Our intelligence community trains local police in sophisticated intelligence techniques. One day they will say, "Alright, we helped you, now you help us." Or, the FBI will be unusually helpful to the phone company in locating and prosecuting people involved in fraud or stealing phone company equipment. This isn't done simply to reduce crime. They are developing a sweetheart arrangement so that later they can come to the company and say, "help us effect an illegal tap."

Q. Can you tell us about the one-way telephone connections between Hunters Stones and Menwith Hill in England?

A. In the British publication *New Statesman*, Duncan Campbell revealed the existence of an underground coaxial cable between the Hunters Stones microwave terminal, which is the central part of the backbone of the British long lines telecommunication system, and the NSA's British listening facility at Menwith Hill. Hunters Stones is a centroid of the British microwave long lines network. It is also the hub through which much of the national security information, radar, and other sensing devices, pass. So it would be unfair to say that *all* the activity passing from Hunters Stones to Menwith Hill is intercepted domestic or international telecommunications. However, the circuit capacity in existence is much beyond that necessary for non-communications intelligence, that is signals intelligence.

Q. Does the same situation exist with the one-way lines going between the Naval Intelligence Support Center in Suitland and the NSA's facility at Fort Meade, and which backs up against AT&T's long distance telephone microwave link in Waldorf, Maryland?

A. That is correct. The circuit capacity in these cases is much greater than is necessary for non-communications intelligence. It is in terms of tens of thousands of one-way



Suitland Microwave Facility Connecting NSA With AT&T Longlines System

parallel circuits. There is no need, generally speaking, for one-way circuits in ordinary communications. One can count on one's hand the very limited necessity for one-way circuits. One is broadcasting, another weather service, another news circuitry, and the stock ticker. But the capacity of the NSA to suck up communications far exceeds these needs, or signals intelligence, or the relatively few wiretaps they admit. So we see that a great vacuum cleaner exists.

With Duncan Campbell's material, there is yet another vacuum cleaner being serviced by extremely broad-banded multicircuited channels going from Hunters Stones.

Q. Is the sole consumer the NSA and associated U.S. agencies?

A. The NSA, often other U.S. agencies, and its hosts in some foreign countries.

Q. Is there a full sharing of what is sucked up?

A. No. In many cases, the NSA has talked the intelligence communities of the host countries into this arrangement by saying, "We have the technical ability, we'll only get this kind of information, we'll pay for it, we'll share it with you." The countries say, "Sure, you can come in." But the fact is, they have been conned, because of their technological naivete, and the NSA is not providing these countries with all the information that is being sucked out of their telecommunication circuits, and they're not telling them the full technological capabilities of the NSA.

It is easy to have one person working next to another,


and neither know what the other is doing. It is easy to have a person sitting within inches of a computer, and not realize the extent to which the computer is doing analysis. The computer may be shuffling off to the side additional categories of information, encrypting it, sending it up to a satellite, and squirting it back to the U.S., without the host country being aware of the extent of the operation.

Q. Does the CIA do this kind of broad-band interception also, or is it done exclusively by the NSA?

A. The CIA is engaged in this kind of activity. However, it is not the prime mover in this business. There is a cooperative effort between the CIA and the NSA. In those few cases where a friendly relationship cannot be effectuated between the NSA and the host country's officials, the CIA will install the equipment of the NSA in a totally covert operation.

Q. Is there anything you can tell us about the National Reconnaissance Office?

A. We know even less about the NRO than the NSA. As we understand it, its primary mission is using techniques of gaining intelligence from satellites. Most of their technology employs optical surveillance, either in the visible region, the infrared and ultraviolet. Gamma radiation scanning, Blue Spike signature detection and also in the microwave spectrum. This is different from the technologies we have discussed before. In this case we find that



NSA Microwave Tower at Ft. Meade

terrain features of the earth are continuously radiating microwave energy, as a result of their temperature, and because they are being impinged upon by microwave energy from outer space. By monitoring this reflected microwave energy, and the natural microwave emanations of the earth, intelligence information can be deduced—the existence of certain facilities, of mineral deposits, the temperature of a portion of the earth, and movements of persons and equipment.

In addition, the NRO is involved in the interception of terrestrial microwave telecommunications radiations by its satellite platforms. This is particularly important because the line of sight of terrestrial microwave interception is limited to about 20 to 30 miles. If we want to intercept a microwave circuit in the interior of the Soviet Union, we might put the microwave interception equipment on a satellite which is not limited by the line of sight barrier imposed by the curvature of the earth.

Q. You mentioned earlier that code makers have outstripped code breakers, and that there are now virtually unbreakable codes. A major justification for the NSA and NRO is not that they monitor American conversations, but foreign conversations, say the Soviets. Wouldn't it be the case that sensitive Soviet communications would be sent in code, so that what the NSA claims it can do, listen in on these conversations, it really can't do?

A. Governments around the world are using very sophisticated encryption techniques for communications between their embassies, and their other elements. The NSA, although it collects this information, is not able to break it. So, the first and second rate nations are simply not having their sensitive communications broken. It is only the emerging nations that are encrypting in a manner that can be broken by the NSA.

However, the mere volume of traffic, whether understood or not, is a significant bit of intelligence information. The fact that a certain military division is increasing the traffic over certain circuits indicates that some activity is going on.

But what is happening is that the NSA is riding on its reputation from World War 2, when it broke the Japanese Naval Code. Many of the old war horses in Congress are veterans who remember that it was very important then to keep the codes secret, and that the NSA was able to break most any code. The NSA has tried to keep this myth alive, but today it is purely a myth. If this myth begins to evaporate, the *raison d'être*, the purpose of existence of the NSA, begins to atrophy.

Q. You have talked about the vast computer facilities of the NSA. Is it possible to describe, in numbers or in area, how much is involved?

A. As the years go by, more sophisticated computers are being developed, while the size of these computers is diminishing. If one were to travel to Fort Meade and look at the buildings, one would be impressed by the size of the facility, but not overly impressed. The reason is that their capability is dispersed around the world—in Texas, throughout the U.S., in England, and around the world. Their computers are dispersed around the world, but linked together by

telecommunications. All of these computers are in effect one computer, a giant octopus that reaches around the world. There are many smaller computers hidden in telecommunications exchanges around the globe that do initial scanning, and switch the intercepted information from the telecommunications lines into the vacuum cleaner, where the more serious analysis is done by more powerful computers.

The NSA budget is more than the CIA's, perhaps more than the NRO's, and estimates run to several billion dollars a year. A large portion goes into hardware and associated software. The NSA is so intertwined with the computer industry that much of the development of modern computers was funded through the NSA: into IBM, into Univac, into Sperry Rand. And this is continuing.

Q. What is the historical practice of the NSA in giving the CIA intercepted information on U.S. citizens?

A. It's not just the CIA, it's the FBI and other agencies too. The problem is that there are channels and a proliferation of much of this intercepted information, which filters through to the Justice Department, the local police, and into regulatory agencies, even into licensing agencies, such as the American Bar Association, medical boards, and boards of educational certification.

Q. There has been some discussion of activity on Capitol Hill. Would you like to get into this?

A. Perhaps you have reference to a certain facility on Capitol Hill, approximately a block and a half from the Capitol, where the Justice Department was apparently operating a safe house for effecting surveillance of persons working on Capitol Hill, telecommunications on Capitol Hill, and so forth. There is no hard evidence that this occurred, except for the fact of unusual security of access and egress into and from the building. It's on Pennsylvania Avenue, east of the Capitol, in an old theater building that is now occupied by Ralph Nader.

I might mention that I've recently been in that building, and the safe room is still there, still being locked and kept inaccessible to Ralph Nader and his operation. While I was in the building, I was able, through a fluke, to gain access to a portion of the building which is not, at the time was not, occupied by a leasor. I went in and there was a telephone man in there, ostensibly to disconnect a pay phone. It was on the ground floor, and there was apparently an FBI agent there also. I walked in and addressed the two gentlemen, asking if this portion of the building was available for rent. I was treated very roughly by this agent, and strongly warned that I shouldn't be there, although the whole area had been vacated.

It is interesting to note that in earlier years, I had done surveillance on this building, casually, by walking through the back side of the building, and determined that the size of the telephone cables was much larger than would be necessary for an ordinary business, or the operation of an ordinary government agency. My argument is that this was a facility for operating surveillance on the telecommunications of people on Capitol Hill, Senators, Congressmen, staff members, and so forth, but this is purely speculative.

Now they have vacated the area. I presume because things got a little too hot for them. It's been at least a year.

Q. Is it your conclusion that this was a Department of Justice facility, or just a cover for another agency?

A. My speculation is that it was a facility operated jointly by the FBI and the NSA. Again, that's purely speculation.

It is interesting to note that I stood outside the building and developed a friendship with a street vendor. The vendor said that one day he had his wares in front of the building, and as he stood there he propped his foot up against the building, and began tapping his heel against the wall. Within a few minutes of his having done this, an agent came out of the door, which has a buzzer; one cannot gain access without pushing a button. The agent came out and sternly told him to stop clicking his heel against the outer

surface of the building, a concrete building. I don't think that is really hard information, but it falls in this genre of the whole attitude of the Justice Department and the intelligence community.

You see, one of the arguments the intelligence community makes is that if we don't develop this technology, and engage in these practices, our adversary, the Soviets, will, because they don't have the "moral compunction" that we do. But in fact it's just a paradox of logic. In fact, we don't have the compunction. The argument of a democratic society should be that when you're on the side of the angels, you fight with one hand behind your back, but you fight the battle and win anyhow, because you are on the side of the angels. This is the reason, the rationale, that we should be taking in a free, democratic society. When we take the position that anything goes, we become less than a free society.

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PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

Books

"Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East," by Wilbur Crane Eveland (Norton; \$14.95). An analysis, by a long-time CIA insider, who worked with the OSS before the CIA was formed, and was for a time secretary to Allen Dulles, of the foibles of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Eveland was involved in a large number of covert operations, particularly in Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and the meticulous detail in his book affords a good look at one particular area where dirty tricks were commonplace.

"The Age of Surveillance," by Frank J. Donner (Knopf; \$17.95). This book, subtitled, "The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System," provides perhaps the most detailed look to date at the institutionalization of government surveillance as a system of political control. It covers virtually the complete history of the FBI, the CIA, and military intelligence, among other organizations, as instruments both of surveillance and of interference, manipulation and provocation. In addition to the body of the volume, there are 48 pages of valuable footnotes and a compilation of J. Edgar Hoover's articles and public speeches between 1940-72.

"Letters from South Korea," by T.K. (IDOC; \$7.95). These collected letters and documents cover primarily the period 1973 to 1975, the early years of full martial law in South Korea, demonstrating in great detail the complete absence of human rights under the South Korean dictatorship.

"Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid," by Elizabeth Schmidt (IPS; \$4.95). A compelling indictment of corporate collaboration with apartheid, in particular a full exposé of the so-called Sullivan principles, a hollow attempt to create the pretense of

reform without any substance. With an introduction by Rep. Ronald V. Dellums.

Periodicals

MERIP Reports (nine times per year, from MERIP, P.O. Box 1247, New York, NY 10025; \$14, individuals; \$24 institutions; single copies \$2). We have mentioned MERIP before in *CAIB*, and want to call to our readers' attention the two latest issues. The September 1980 issue, with the theme, "The Vietnam Syndrome," includes an excellent review of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, "The Carter Doctrine and U.S. Bases", by Joe Stork. It also includes Michael Klare's "War Games for the '80s," and an interview with Eqbal Ahmad on Pakistan and U.S. Strategy.

The October 1980 issue focuses on Saudi Arabia, where political developments will be of vast importance around the world in the coming decades. There are articles on the insurrection at Mecca, on the political structure of the Saudi state, and on the "special relationship" between the U.S. and the Saudi government regarding oil.

Palestine (approximately quarterly, from Palestine Solidarity Committee, P.O. Box 1757, New York, NY 10027; ten issues, \$10). The newsletter of the Palestine Solidarity Committee, with comprehensive coverage of developments affecting Palestine, both in the Middle East and around the world.

Caribbean Perspective (ten times per year; \$10, from Caribbean Perspective, P.O. Box 2194, Brooklyn, NY 11202). A new U.S. publication of the Caribbean People's Alliance, with comprehensive, progressive analyses of events in the Caribbean, and of liberation movements around the world.

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